Avicenna – God & Metaphysics

Avicenna’s Conception God and Metaphysics
Student’s Name:
Institutional Affiliation:
Avicenna’s Conception God and Metaphysics
Avicenna considers metaphysics a philosophical science. It is a logically proven science that allows the mind of a human being to attain an accurate conception of the world’s interior structure, therefore, providing an explanation behind every actual being. The Neo-platonic concepts are the foundation of Avicenna’s ideologies that cause him to rely on the fact that metaphysics encompasses cosmology, theology, and angelology (Bertolacci, 2007). Metaphysics endorses the tenets of science that examines the states of certain substances in nature and those in subordinate positions. Because metaphysics comprehends realism and deals with qua being, it is considered the leading science. This paper examines the Avicenna’s concepts on the connection between God and metaphysics that is; the knowledge human beings have concerning God and that of the world perception.
The main concepts of Avicenna’s effort involved the explanation of God’s existence and the world creation (Bertolacci, 2007). The proof provided in the process is founded on his reliance on reason and not just mere observations made on how the world changes. As of his evidence from contingency, Avicenna acknowledges the actuality of a self-existing being is God. The existence of an entity can be either “only possible” or “in itself.” Supposing that the body occurs independently of other causes and beings, it becomes exceptional and without multiplicity.

If the creation of the humans were hypothetical, further evidence would be required to intricate why it was believed as reality rather than non-existence. Avicenna does not just argue that an eventuality is extant, it is set that an extrinsic origin dictates the creation of the contingency (Marmura, 2010). According to Avicenna, the cause that necessitates effect is the vivacious origin. Avicenna submits that the world’s actuality and all the order present in nature emanate from God.
Another characteristic of God that features in Avicenna’s philosophical views is the self-knowledgeable aspect whose outcome is a compelled first intelligence. Following the occurrence of the first intelligence is the encounter with the pre-existent facts about the way of life. The facts point at a self-existent entity – God, which means that the presence of a first intelligence is a result of the sub-sequential existence of a self-existent entity. Intellect is an example of an “only possible” entity. Summed up, Avicenna’s concepts reflect upon a God who is everlasting and one who necessitates cause in ceaseless action compelling the occurrence of an interminable entity –the world.
The fact that God is self-knowledgeable explains the origin of the world and everything in nature. God’s self-knowledge involves the awareness about himself being the source of every existing entity. By that, it is clear that he is conscious of the subsequent effects of his causation. Avicenna reasons that the self-existent being – God, is acquainted with every existent on earth, in a general way. The kind of understanding that involves “understanding the particular” is also suitable for divine intelligence (Marmura, 2010). The Avicennian sacred triangles form the basis of comprehending the general “knowledge of the particular.”
To understand nature, one has to recognize that creation is an apt metaphysical topic that does not link directly to physical science. The philosopher insists on the distinction between existence and insistence. Avicenna did not lack critics of his works, though. Al-Ghazali was a Muslim theologian, a jurist, and mystic who feared that Avicenna’s metaphysics would contaminate the Islam views about God since they did not agree with the doctrines in the Koran. The jurist stood in defense of the Islamic doctrines of creation which he considered to be conventional to counter Avicenna’s ideas of an eternal world. Some philosophers surprisingly, agreed with Al-Ghazali arguing that suppose the world was eternal, its reliance on the self-existent being will not be essential as it would be self-sufficient.
Divine Providence has a close association with the principle of self-providence. God’s awareness of himself as being the source of order, all goodness and perfection as regards to possibility and the contentment that came with the order he had created all add up to the divinity of his providence. What follows satisfaction is the perception of the impeccable order in the finest way possible. Avicenna did not entirely challenge the existence of evil but rather; he tried to explain the concept of evil. He states that evil is associated with physical substances and potency. He adds by declaring that evils are only inadvertent penalties that occur for a better purpose for beings since they affect individuals. Both Avicenna’s metaphysics and political philosophy are linked by the idea of divine providence.
According to Al-Ghazali, the position Avicenna claimed in his explanation of an “only possible” eternal world lacked coherence. It is, however, possible to draw a statement of how God relates to the world and the general idea of causality by studying Avicenna’s creation perceptions. Emanation causation subsumes influence and motion causality; sustained by the ideas of reception and donation. Avicenna establishes his theoretical works through metaphysics. He provides a detailed elaboration of the philosophy of theology and physics using metaphysics. It is, therefore, evident that every work Avicenna dedicated to philosophy can be pertinent in the comprehension of his abstract thoughts.
References
Bertolacci, A. (2007). “Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God’s Existence and the Subject-Matter of Metaphysics.” Medioevo, (32), pp. 61–97.
Marmura, M. E. (2010). Avicenna’s Proof from Contingency for God’s Existence in the Metaphysics of the Shifā’. Mediaeval Studies, (42), 337-352.
Marmura, M. E. (2012). Some aspects of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 82(3), 299-312.