Constitutionanality of: Affirmative Action in Higher Education

Name
Instructor’s name
Subject
Date
Constitutionality of “Affirmative Action in Higher Education”
Outline
Introduction
Definition of an affirmative act
Provisions of the action in higher learning
Thesis statement
Body
The Case of Fisher
Arguments raised in the case.
Ruling on the case.
The Case of Bakke
Arguments raised in the case.
Ruling on the case.
Conclusion
Reflection on the issues raised in the discussion
Deduction of the discussion
Introduction
An affirmative act is a regulatory program that trails to reduce prejudices that are directed to particular clusters such as racial groups, and indigenous subgroups. The program aims to upsurge entree and reasonable dispersal of prospects in higher learning, occupation and other sectors under social-welfare. Constitutionality of confirmatory action in upper edification offers conventions, techniques, and strategies so as to make sure that qualified and engrossed residents get an equal chance irrespective of their race, civilization, gender, conviction, or oldness. Conversely, the act does not confine all practices of discernment or declare them to be illegal, but it endeavors to recompense antique disparities by providing customarily diminished groups with equal entrance to most civic and reserved arena. Thus, this enables the government to deal with inequities and disparities within a short time. The equal protection clause in the U.S Constitution provides that “no state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws” (Issacharoff and Karlan).

Therefore, this paper shall explore the legality of affirmative deeds in higher edification.
The Case of Fisher v. University of Texas
The U.S Supreme Court endorsed the custom of race-conscious selection programs in universities through the completion of the Fisher v. the University of Texas legal battle that had lasted for eight years. The court apprehended that the appellant was unable to show by a throng of the proof that she was repudiated equality in defilement of the “Equal Protection Clause” when she was denied an undergraduate admittance to the University (Riccucci, 175).
In 2008, the university applied two-part classification to enroll students to the varsity. The model consisted of the “top ten percent plan” and a “full-file holistic review.” The “top ten percent plan” holds that any apprentice who graduates in the first ten group of their class in Texas is inevitably ratified for admission to a university of their choice within the state. In the University of Texas, 75 percent of first-year students were admitted via this method in 2008 while the outstanding 25 percent were chosen using a holistic review of every student’s application. Therefore, the university incorporated race as one of the sub-factor that shall be considered in the holistic review. The plaintiff was subjected to the university’s comprehensive review since she was not among the top ten graduates of her high school class and she was never admitted.
The case shows that when a government body chooses to use race as a taxonomy for a particular group of people to either obtain gain or be underprivileged, then the use of such a cataloging is subject to the most rigorous judicial appraisal (Dandekar, n.p). Therefore, this implies that when a racial cataloging is challenged in a court of law, the entity must prove that it had a fascinating administrative concern in applying for the program. Universities are not allowed to enact simple racial measures, but they can invent a race-conscious selection policy that shall increase diversity in the varsity.
In the case, the court administrated that the varsity’s application of race in the selection of new students was constitutional. The court found out that the university had expressed solid and specific objectives for its program and had acknowledged informative principles that uphold cross-racial indulgent. Therefore, this implies that the holistic review that was applied by the university had an evocative effect on the assortment of the student’s admissions. On the same note, the substantiation buoyed the university’s contention that there were no other race-neutral substitutes that could assist it to achieve its objectives (Wathington, 215). Consequently, this implies that race-conscious admissions dogmas in universities shall stay for a long time in the history of humanity.
The Bakke Case
The plaintiff had applied to the University of California, but he was denied admission despite having strong grades and good test scores. According to the authoritative account, Allan was hurt by his decision to make a late application since his interview took place when many seats in the entering class had been occupied. Therefore, this made Bakke blame racial quotas since the faculty of medicine had set aside a fixed number of spaces for non-white students who were admitted with lower grades and standardized tests as compared to their white applicants (Kim, 18). Bakke claimed that the segregated admissions method led to reverse discrimination against whites. Solely on the race basis, white students were subjected to differential treatment, an act that is prohibited under the equal protection law (Krishnamurthy and Edlin, n.p).
In school unification cases, the federal courts relied on strict numerical standards to ensure racial balance. School districts had engaged in intentional discrimination, and orders based on unification were a way to remedy the effects of these past injustices. However, in the case, no one alleged that the Davis medical school had intentionally barred nonwhite students from the class. Four members of the court established that race-based affirmative action was impermissible except as an option for an institute’s past inequitable practices. Hence, this implies that Davis officials should have refrained from considering race in any manner in the admission process. On the other hand, four other members of the court looked to congressional and executive actions that had authorized the consideration of race even in the absence of prior misconduct (Kim, 14). They established that positive discrimination was an acceptable way of addressing racial disparities in access to higher education. Therefore, this implied that the Davis program was permissible in the society. Therefore, Justice Lewis Powell came in to break the deadlock when she concluded that race-based admissions practices were permissible so as to advance diversity in higher education.
Powell rejected many justifications of the medical school’s program as he developed a strict scrutiny rationale on the prospective benefits rather than bygone injustices. The school needed to show that race-conscious admissions program was essential so as to promote a compelling state interest. He established that affirmative action was not a constitutionally permissible means of rectifying societal discrimination so as to increase the population of underrepresented subgroups. Conversely, Powell advocated the use of race-conscious admittances by petitioning the medical school’s educational autonomy to edifice the educational process in its appropriate consideration.
Conclusion
Constitutionality of affirmative acts in universities has been depicted in many cases across the globe. In the above-discussed cases, the complainants sought answers to the different instances that they were discriminated because of their racial composition. The examples depicted that affirmative deeds ought to be considered when selecting new students to varsities. The arguments in the cases showed that universities were not allowed to execute simple racial slices, but they can contrive race-conscious admission policies so as to enable them to upsurge the multiplicity of their student bodies. Therefore, issues based on the constitutionality of affirmative deeds in universities can be upheld for plaintiffs or defendants regarding the program implemented by higher education varsities.
Work Cited
Dandekar, Pranav. “A Statistical Framework And Optimal Policy for Affirmative Action in Higher Education Admissions”. SSRN Electronic Journal n. pag. Web.
Issacharoff, S. & Karlan, P. (2003). Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection Clause. Issues In Legal Scholarship, 2(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1539-8323.1016
Kim, Joon K. “From Bakke To Grutter: Rearticulating Diversity And Affirmative Action In Higher Education”. Multicultural Perspectives 7.2 (2005): 12-19. Web.
Krishnamurthy, Prasad and Aaron S. Edlin. “Affirmative Action And Stereotypes In Higher Education Admissions”. SSRN Electronic Journal n. pag. Web.
Riccucci, N. M. “Fisher V. University Of Texas: A Call For Democratic Constitutionalism In Promoting Diversity”. Administration & Society 46.2 (2013): 169-180. Web.
Wathington, Heather D. “Talking Affirmative Action: Race, Opportunity, And Everyday Ideology (Review)”. The Review of Higher Education 30.2 (2007): 214-216. Web.