Helen Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company Case Analysis FACTS

Helen Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company Case Analysis
FACTS
Palsgraf had already bought her ticket and was waiting to board a train when two men came in a hurry to board an already moving train.
One man managed to climb the train platform safely but the other man who was carrying an unknown package concealed in a newspaper was slow. He seemed unsteady while boarding the train and was helped by two Railroad company employees onto the train platform.
The package he was carrying fell and caused an explosion that damaged the platform and some debris reached Palsgraf and caused mental and physical injury. Because the package apparently carried fireworks. This, therefore, is the reason Palsgraf is suing the Railroad company.
ISSUES
Could a defendant be found or held accountable for negligence resulting in injury for actions that cannot be reasonably anticipated?
Could there be an interaction that is causationally absolute among all the temporal happenings that could accurately single out negligent parties?
RULES
No, a defendant could not be found or held accountable for injury resulting to injury for deeds that cannot be reasonably anticipated. Because the respondent is only obligated to the duty of care if the respondent is in a reasonably expected zone of danger.
No, there is no interaction that is absolutely causational among all the temporal events that could accurately single out negligent parties. Because of two factors, firstly, negligence that is actionable must be proven through a duty of care and violation of a right or legally protected interest.

Secondly, there is the presence of legal limits of immunity through both anticipated temporal and physical environments forced upon the respondent.
ANALYSIS
In an analysis of the situation where tort applies, the law of negligence, a duty of care that is owed and then broken must be determined from the risk that can most likely be anticipated under the immediate circumstances and be within the zone of danger (White, 1894). In that case the appellant, Long Island Rail Road company did not owe the appellee, Hellen Palsgraf, because the explosion could not have been foreseen reasonably. The two Railroad employees did not have an idea of what was in the package the second man carried as it was covered in a newspaper. They were just genuinely helping the passenger onto the train platform, and the falling of the package and its afterword consequences were not pre-planned or organized. Also, the respondent was relatively far away from the immediate danger zone as she stood at the far opposite end of the platform.
The causational relation among the events in the setup has legal confines of immunity forced on Palsgraf; this is concluded by the derivation right of action for interest incursion or right violation. Because the body of the appellee is not legally covered as to be protected by the company from all forms of damage within the premises of the Company but only some protection considering some level of reasonability. Despite the fact that the appellee had bold facts related to both his physical and mental injury, those damages were countered by the defendants, a defense that determined she was not owed a duty of the company (Zipursky, 1757). This led to the Court of Appeals of New York decided to reverse the judgment, and the cost of the court consigned to the appellee.
Works Cited
White, G. Edward. “Emergence and Doctrinal Development of Tort Law, 1870-1930, The.” U. St. Thomas LJ 11 (2013): 463.
Zipursky, Benjamin C. “Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption.” Harvard Law Review 125.7 (2012): 1757-1797.