Is the US Electoral College System a Fair Way to Democracy or Not?

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Is the US Electoral College System a Fair Way to Democracy or Not?
The Electoral College is an institution composed of electors who are selected by voters in their respective States, and they play the role of formally electing the US president and his vice president. On the other hand, a Popular Vote is the election of a US president through the qualified voters in different states of America (Smith, 205). Therefore, this implies that when the American citizens vote for a president and a vice president, they are essentially balloting for the presidential electors who shall designate the chief executive. The US Convention of 1787 took into contemplation numerous techniques of electing the president such as assortment by the Congress, the directors of the States, state legislatures and a direct popular vote. Later in the treaty, the matter was devoted to the “Committee of Eleven on Postponed Matters” that formulated the “Electoral College system” in its unique custom (Glenn, 5). The plan was aimed at insulating the voting practice from doctrinaire influence as equated to the other approaches that had been applied in earlier years. The Electoral College system and the Popular Vote process have led to different arguments from the various parts of the American Union. Therefore, this paper shall provide a counter argument to the views that the Electoral College System is not a fair way and the American people need to go back to the Popular Vote system.

The system leads to the coherence of the realm by necessitating a distribution of popular backing of the elected chief executive. Hence, this implies that if the system were abolished, the premier would be designated over the ascendancy of one populated State over the others or through the dominance of the key cosmopolitan areas over the countryside expanses. On the same note, the body requires that executive contenders handpick deputy presidential running mates from a diverse State apart from that of their origin. Similarly, no region holds an outright preponderance of the electoral votes that are necessary to designate a president. The incentive makes presidential candidates pull coalitions of States together rather than aggravating regional differences (Calderaro, n.p). Therefore, the actuality of such a coalescing organization seems to be a judicious notion particularly to the unadorned complications that have classically afflicted geologically hefty countries like China, and India. However, the Confederacy appliance comes with a minor expense in circumstances when popular polls make a contender who triumphs a trivial preponderance of the prevalent votes not to be the one designated as the commander. Practically, the problem is a lesser one since the widespread variance amid the two would likely be smaller that any contender could rule commendably.
Thus, the defenders of the Electoral College system contemplate that the concrete significance of compelling a dissemination of popular backing overshadows whatever maudlin significance that may be devoted in attaining a mere preponderance of the prevalent backing. They say that the structure is designated to operate in a coherent sequence of defaults that help in reinstating order in the country when a division is realized among the populace in different States of the Federation (Fon, 55). The first default is when a contender obtains a considerable preponderance of the popular poll, and then that aspirant is essentially confident to triumph abundant electoral ballots so as to be designated as president. Similarly, if the general vote is too close amid the two aspirants, then the voting shall default to the contestant with the paramount dissemination of popular votes. On the same note, if neither of the contenders running for the position attains the utter preponderance of the electoral votes, then the picking of the president goes to the States in the U.S. House of Representatives. Therefore, the winning aspirant must exhibit adequate popular backing as well as a sufficient dissemination of that patronage so as to rule despite the procedure applied by the current system.
The “Electoral College” heightens the eminence of marginalized citizens that are signified in diverse States of the Union. The process has enabled electorates of trivial factions in a State to create a variance amid winning all of the State’s elects or none of the State’s electoral votes. Therefore, this has made these groups to assume significance to the presidential candidates out of the proportion of their number. A similar aspect relates to other distinctive interest clusters like labor unions, agriculturalists, ecologists and many sets within the States (James, 163). On the same note, this power effect has made the body of the presidency more profound to the indigenous groups and other special interest assemblies as equated to the Congress as an institution. Consequently, if the US resolves to transform to the Popular Vote system, then the policy will damage marginalized welfares since their votes will be overwhelmed by a national popular preponderance.
The United States has attained political solidity through the reinforcement of a two party scheme by the Electoral College. The technique has made it challenging for a fresh or inconsequential party to win abundant popular votes in momentous States so as to have a fortuitous of winning the presidency position. Even if they win ample electoral votes so as to make the verdict go to the U.S. House of Representatives, they are still prerequisite to have a dominance of over half of the State designation so as to designate their candidate. Consequently, this will make them be deliberated as a trivial party and never get the prospect of taking over the top job of the nation.
The “Electoral College” plays the role of effectively compelling third party engagements into one of the two key political parties so as to shield the presidency institution from extreme but ephemeral third party actions. Equally, the major political parties encompass each facet to engross minor party movements in their obstinate efforts to win popular margins in the States. Therefore, in the course of acclimatization, third party movements are obligated to compromise their drastic outlooks if they expect to achieve any of their putative ideas (Grofman, Brunell, and Campagna, 480). Consequently, this has made the U.S to end up in two hefty and reasonable political movements that incline to the focus of public outlook instead of having several minor political movements that gratify to conflicting and at times radical opinions. Thus, the system can be seen as one that powers political alliances to take place within the political parties afore within the national government.
Conversely, a direct popular election of the president would prime to an inducement for a degree of minor movements so as to come up with a stab of any popular preponderance required to elect a president. Consequently, the enduring aspirants would be wan to the regionalist or intemperate outlooks that are exemplified by their corresponding parties with the expectations of winning the run-off balloting. Thus, the outcomes of the popular election structure would probably be tattered and prime to unhinged political structures that are categorized by a scale of political movements and the development of radical vagaries in dogmas from one government to another. Hence, this appeals in for the “Electoral College” system that reassures political parties to coalesce divergent safeties into two sets of coherent alternatives. Therefore, such an organization of social skirmish and political consideration underwrites to the political permanence of the nation.
The “Electoral College” upholds a federal structure of government and exemplification as equated to the Popular Vote system. In an official federal edifice, significant political supremacies need to be reticent to the constituent States. In the U.S, the “Electoral College” was designed to epitomize each State’s prime for the presidency with the total of every State’s electoral ballots being the figure of its Senators alongside the number of its Representatives (Fon, 47). Therefore, an abolishment of the organization for a countrywide popular voting for the presidency would entail incursion at the soul of the federal edifice that was laid out in the Constitution. Hence, this would clue to the detriment of the States of the state-owned central regime that has endured many eras since the establishment of the federal scheme.
The initial scheme of the federal regime that came up with the “Electoral College” was meticulously and extensively deliberated by the “Founding Fathers of the U.S” who decided that State viewpoints are vital than political minority perspectives. Therefore, the shared outlook of discrete State populaces is more imperative than the indication of the national civic when reflected as a whole (Draper, 49). Thus, the Americans should not interfere with the vigilant supremacy poise between the Federal and State administrations that was projected by America’s founders and replicated in the “Electoral College.” Abolishing the system would profoundly modify the nature of the U.S rule and may result in magnitudes that even the advocates of the popular vote may emanate to compunction.
In my point of view, the Electoral College accomplishes the three vital elements that any presidential election must meet in a democratic world. Firstly, the system measures what can be established of the popular wish sufficiently so as to make sure that the elected president has a popular basis of support. Secondly, the results obtained from the system tend to give the head of state substantial political legitimacy. On the same note, it permits democracy to fulfill its core but modest function that holds that leaders should rule based on the public interests rather than personal interests or the interests of narrow hidebound sections (Grofman, Brunell & Campagna, 475). Therefore, this shows that the system stands out to be a fair practice in electing presidents in the U.S and its opponents should look at the wider consequences associated with the abolishment of the scheme.
Similarly, the current electoral system achieves what a popular vote system can deliver concerning presidential elections. The system eliminates candidates who lack a substantial basis of support as the case of Ralph Nader. On the same note, the system has measured changes in popular sentimentality over the allowance of alterations to be signified by the dogmas promoted by the personalities elected as presidents. Hence, the dispassionate of a person, it may be difficult to say that the course of the American history would have been better through the application of the popular vote system. Thus, those who dislike the implementation of the Electoral College should be aware that the popular vote has its repercussions that are worse than those of the electoral system.
The complaints raised by the opponents of the Electoral College do not reveal that it has failed in any essential function. They argue that the system redounds to the advantage of small States, but they should note that the hefty States are the supreme privileged in the contemporary scheme of choosing a president (Siaroff, 135). I agree with the fact that small States get an advantaged on the senatorial bonus through the two votes that are awarded to any State irrespective of their population density. But, as long as the various States vote under the outlined rules of awarding the winner all the State’s electoral votes, the advantage is likely to prove decisive among the big States in the Union. A good illustration is the calculations that have been done by mathematicians that prove that the voter in California counts more than twice as much as the voter in Wyoming during a presidential election. Therefore, changing complex rules in a system that is reticulated may give rise to secondary effects that are not witnessed in the current generation.
The opponents of the Electoral College claim that the system makes candidates to pay attention to swing States rather than the whole nation perspective (Grofman, Brunell & Campagna, 472). According to my personal judgment, the tendency does not seem to be a flaw since a popular vote will also make candidates to pay more attention to some voters rather than others more so voters who depict the least voter turnout. Hence, if the popular vote is adopted, then candidates are likely to concentrate their campaigns in cities as compared to rural areas and more in prosperous areas than poor regions (Smith, 199). Therefore, the associated shortcoming of the popular system may be more extensive than the current focus on swing States since voters in swing States are likely to be more diverse than voters chosen by low turnout cost. Practically, it ought to be eminent that both methods of choosing the president cannot treat citizens equally and no system can be created that shall have similar effects given that voters are only equal as the matter of law, but differently positioned.
In conclusion, it ought to be eminent that the dispute on “Electoral College” in the present setting is all about the drive of democracy and the applications of its mechanisms. Hence, I have always defended the Electoral College due to the shielding notion of democracy that disseminates power through the society so that to make sure that politics does not interfere but sustain the set frameworks for a prosperous nation. Hence, this concept of democracy is achieved by the current method of electing the president in unification with the legislative elections. The Electoral College has carried out its functions for a long time by making sure that the U.S president depicts popular support that is sufficiently distributed all over the country so as to enable him to rule effectively. The system only drew few anomalies in its earlier history, but none has been witnessed in the generation. The substitutes projected by those who are against the scheme have always appeared to be more knotty in comparison to the College arrangement. Therefore, the above counter-argument proves that the “Electoral College System” is a fair way and the American should not go back to the “Popular Vote System.”

Work Cited
Calderaro, Geoffrey Felix. “Promoting Democracy While Preserving Federalism: The Electoral College, The National Popular Vote, And The Federal District Popular Vote Allocation Alternative”. SSRN Electronic Journal n. pag. Web.
Draper, Brandon Marc. “Popular Fallacy: A Public Choice Analysis Of Electoral College Reform”. International Journal of Public Law and Policy 1.1 (2011): 49. Web.
Fon, Vincy. “Electoral College Alternatives And US Presidential Elections”. Supreme Court Economic Review 12 (2004): 41-73. Web.
Glenn, Gary. “The Electoral College And The Development Of American Democracy”. Perspectives on Political Science 32.1 (2003): 4-8. Web.
Grofman, Bernard, Thomas Brunell, and Janet Campagna. “Distinguishing Between The Effects Of Swing Ratio And Bias On Outcomes In The US Electoral College, 1900–1992”. Electoral Studies 16.4 (1997): 471-487. Web.
James, Scon C. “A Party System Perspective On The Interstate Commerce Act Of 1887: The Democracy, Electoral College Competition, And The Politics Of Coalition Maintenance”. Studies in American Political Development 6.01 (1992): 163. Web.
Siaroff, Alan. “1876, 1916 And Now 2000: Decisive Small State Bias In The US Electoral College”. Representation 38.2 (2001): 131-139. Web.
Smith, Bradley A. “Vanity Of Vanities: National Popular Vote And The Electoral College”. Election Law Journal 7.3 (2008): 196-217. Web.