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The Obama Doctrine and the US Nuclear Strategy
Name
Institution
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Obama doctrine with regard to the US nuclear strategy? How did it influence the US security? is it positively or negatively? Why or why not?
Introduction
This paper seeks to discuss the Obama doctrine and how it influenced the US nuclear strategy. In this light, it will cover the importance of reducing nuclear weapons to the US security, the significance of preventing the spread of nuclear armaments, US relationship with Russia and other nuclear powers. The advantages and disadvantages of nuclear abolishing nuclear weapons and the future trends on the US nuclear policy and security. In this respect, the Obama doctrine incorporates two main ideas; the first one concerns America’s role in world affairs. This is regardless of the majority view of America as an aggressive and arrogant nation characterized by its failure to understand others, selfishness in chasing its interests as opposed to universal benefits, seeking too much attention for its independence, sovereignty, and freedom of action. The other idea is another idea is that multilateral organizations offer of best hope for limiting US power and regulating national assertiveness (Goldberg, 2016). The former US president Barrack Obama first promoted this perspective in 2009 in Cairo, where he brought to light a discourse that exists between Americans and Muslims. He highlighted that it is due to their hostility that America reacted contrary to their values in 2001.

He mentioned that America’s efforts to institute acceptable international behavioral standards amounted self-interests and imposing their will on others. It is at this point that he condemned what he thought as unlimited American power and declared independence from the country’s record of bad behavior.
Obama’s Cairo speech sheds light on his determination to clear legal and institutional restraints on America’s ability to take international action independently for its interests. These sentiments gave rise to the nuclear strategy that aimed at destroying military targets. The Obama’s administration budgeted for more than a trillion dollar to continue implementing the US nuclear strategy. This budget included funds to cater for the creation of a new cohort of missiles, bombers and significant upgrades to intricate facilities required to ensure reliability and safety of the nuclear weapons. It targeted a long list of industrial and military sites with the idea of paralyzing its opponent’s military capability in case of a crisis. The Obama’s 2011 review of the nation’s nuclear policies recapped a dependence on this counterforce strategy. U.S. strategists viewed this policy as a strengthening restriction since the US president could be limited by moral reservations about revenging using destructive nuclear weapons. The Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review was a disappointment to those who initially looked at Obama’s administration as a move to America’s new nuclear posture that supports America’s interests and security concerns. Unfortunately, Obama aimed to promote eventual eradication of nuclear weapons. This was in line with the plan of the doctrine, which was to decrease military spending, international commitments, avoiding further military conflicts and especially those requiring long engagements and reallocation of preserved resources to resolve domestic issues (Evangelista, 2018). The former US president Obama was very persistent to uphold this strategy even in the face of political and military problems.
The US nuclear strategy
Former US president’s second term in office saw various developments in significant policy areas, for instance, the country withdrew its military crew from Afghanistan in 2014, and the abolition of the US nuclear strategy. Obama hoped that the nuclear strategy would make progress by embarking on a three-prong approach. First, it would involve intensive effort with Russia to build extended cuts in the two country’s deliberate nuclear weapons. Secondly, to enable this, the former president wanted to moderate the function of nuclear arsenals in the US security by slowly amassing the utility of non-nuclear armaments to execute tasks that were initially reserved for nuclear weapons (Futter, 2009). Thirdly, Obama would prevent the spread and use of nuclear weaponry by actors who pose security threats to the United States through a refurbished approach to global nuclear security and non-proliferation.
Importance of reducing Nuclear Weapons to US Security
Obama had thoughtfully assessed America’s state of security before bringing the US abolishment strategy on board. He had evaluated the role of nuclear weaponry in the US national security. The plan began during the Bush administration where he demonstrated a compelling tendency to use advanced conventional weaponry for functions that were previously performed by nuclear arsenals. As such, it appeared that Obama hoped to lessen the nation’s dependence on nuclear arms to aid the global advocacy for disarmament and at the same time restore the US national security. Obama strived to strike a balance between nuclear and conventional weapons that reflected the state of US security needs. The plan to reduce nuclear armaments was enabled by new technologies and the dynamic nature of the US security, which allowed non-nuclear armaments to perform duties that were previously reserved for nuclear weapons (Kristensen, 2010). The most prominent development was the increased significance of ballistic missile defense. Initially, Obama appeared enthusiastic to reduce the role of missile weapons to ensure that it did not interfere with the US-Russian armory control discussions. The reality is that the former US president strived to provide a balance where missile defense would be used to boost restriction against rascal nuclear threats where nuclear retaliation may be insufficient. At the same time, Obama wanted to ensure that the missile defense plans did not destabilize nuclear reductions with Russia.
Preventing the Spread of Nuclear armaments
Obama’s desire to limit the use and number of nuclear weapons was a reflection of the US strategic interests. In this respect, availability of large numbers of nuclear weaponry posed a threat to the US security. The danger was enhanced by the emergence of rascal states such as Iran and North Korea who intended to acquire the ability to handle nuclear weapons (Müller, 2011). More so, the US security might have been at stake due to the spread and proliferation of nuclear technology, and there would be higher chances of terror groups having nuclear weapons in possession. As such, Obama fought for the reestablishment of international nuclear non-proliferation through the New Start TREATY during the Prague speech (Warren, 2013). In 2010, Obama convened the Nuclear Security Summit where he aimed to enhance nuclear non-proliferation norms internationally by making it harder for countries across the world to acquire nuclear technology.
Russia and the Obama Nuclear Strategy
Russia and America have a strong connection, being the most potent nuclear powers in the universe; America cannot get what it wants without Russia. On the other hand, Russia has a lot that it wants from America to erase the bad memories from its 90’s, where it almost collapsed after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, Obama’s administration that began in 2009 was determined to restore relations with Russia and to return a more conventional approach towards strategic arms control (Mathers, 2012). As such, apart from advocating for a nuclear weapons free world in the Prague meeting, Obama also mentioned that ensuring a safe and secure nuclear deterrent environment was still crucial to the US security interest until all the nuclear weapons were eliminated. Thus, in 2009 Obama initiated negotiations with the Russian president with the aim of eradicating the arms to prevent a nuclear attack. Although the discussion failed to yield an agreement by that time, progress was later realized when Russia agreed to sign the treaty to reduce nuclear arsenals. However, the Obama’s approach raised concerns such as whether he wanted to deemphasize the function of nuclear weapons in the US National security policy and if he was ready to change the declaratory policy. Previously, the declaratory policy offered an assurance of no use of nuclear armory against particular nations but restrained the option of first use of these weapons against other countries. The strategy ensured a certain degree of ambiguity concerning the use of nuclear weapons when responding to an attack with biological or chemical weapons. As such, some people thought that a resounding strategy of restricting “first use” of these arms would advance Obama’s desire to decrease the role of nuclear weapons. Another question was whether the Obama’s administration was ready to ensure that the policy shift was adopted in a way that maintained effective deterrence and did not weaken the reassurance of US allies (Sanger & Baker, 2010). At the same time, the administration struggled with the importance of expanding deterrence as it handled the challenges posed by other nuclear-armed countries such as North Korea and Iran.
In July 2009, Clinton who was by then the secretary of the State suggested that if Iran was to acquire nuclear weapons, then the United States government had to prepare to extend the defense umbrella to the neighboring countries in the region. The Nuclear posture review also surveyed the negative security assertions that the US would offer to non-nuclear nations (Mathers, 2012). Since 1978, the American Government has provided security assurances regarding states against which it would not attack using nuclear weapons. However, despite the pledge, the United States maintained a certain level of ambiguity regarding whether it would use nuclear arms in response to an attack with other types of munitions that would cause immense destruction. As such, the Obama administration sought to expand the concept of deterrence to include other weapons such as missiles and advanced conventional arms. However, the US missile defense efforts only focused on small attacks by less developed countries such as Iran and North Korea. The Obama administration did not seek the capability to conquer a broader attack that could be planned by a sophisticated country such as Russia as that would be expensive and would cause a missile accumulation by Russia.
Advantages of the Obama Doctrine based on the Nuclear Strategy
The abolition of the nuclear weapons would lead to the introduction of weapons of acceptable risk. There is no doubt that nuclear war can have catastrophic consequences. Nuclear conflicts can result in massive destruction of life and property. No administrative or military aim can rationalize the outcome of such a war. Nuclear accidents, disasters, malfunctions and false alarms usually as a result of human error or mechanical problems continue to increase. Such circumstances may include smashes of submarines and nuclear-armed planes, confusing sunlight reflections for enemy missile launches or misplacing nuclear weapons. All these pose security threats to a nation (Lonsdale, 2013). Therefore, Obama’s nuclear abolishment initiative was quite beneficial to the US and the world at large, as it helped avoid the occurrence of such incidences.
Deterrence of the weapons was necessary, as it would restrain possible threats to the security of the US. America exists in a world where countries possessing nuclear arms have state goals that are hostile to the interests of the US. Terror groups such as the Al-Qaeda have attacked not only the United States but also other countries such as Pakistan, Britain and other NATO countries. All these nations possess nuclear weapons or collaborate with nuclear supremacies. The presence of these nuclear arms in the era of universal terrorisms forms a significant safety problem for all countries in the world (Müller, 2011). The main ambiguity in the current atmosphere is not whether terrorist groups will attack states but whether their attackers will obtain the means to transition from traditional weaponry to use of nuclear armaments. This would make the inevitable attacks to have more severe consequences. The Obama review of the nuclear strategy was quite essential, as it would help prevent such attacks by denying terrorists and non-state actors the ability to obtain nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Review Posture by Obama was the most effective tool that has ever been developed to prevent war between the US and other nuclear-armed countries. This view is plausible, given the rate of relapse of conventional conflicts before the nuclear abolition strategy was initiated. This view was embraced by the national security of most warring countries since it would help prevent conflict from occurring (Futter, 2009). Further, nuclear deterrence would induce more caution during crises thus making leaders more hesitant to take military action. As a result, warring nations may be prompted to resolve their conflicts before it escalates to more adverse military exchanges.
Obama’s pledge to pursue peace and safety by eliminating the use of nuclear munitions has created an opportunity to understand the destructive nature of these arms. The global risk of nuclear warfare indicates civilization’s passage of a critical breakthrough and demonstrates an essential truth of the current universal security environment. Nations that have advanced technology have gained numerous techniques to ruin one another. The total number of countries with this potential will certainly grow as practical skills and knowledge continue to mushroom across the world. Nuclear arms may be the first case of weapons with such aptitude, and new and more disastrous armory of prominent human devastation may continuously emerge with advancements in technology. Thus, the Obama doctrine of restoring peace is a great milestone towards positive relationships among warring countries (Futter, 2009).
The nuclear paradox has helped nations learn by clarifying that pursuing security from a national standpoint is unproductive. The physical and environmental sciences reinforce this perspective as they claim that there is nothing like national security, the only form that exists is collective or international security. Obama tries to bring in a global security structure based on the enthusiasm of countries to reduce or thwart the use of nuclear munitions as a solution to the security dilemma.
Obama’s commitment to obtain good relations with other nations through deterrence of nuclear weapons is advantageous in the sense that, it will help reduce aggression between great powers. It will also minimize human errors associated with nuclear arsenals that may lead to unprecedented loss of human life. Nuclear weapons are not effective while confronting or resolving upcoming universal security problems. Hence, sturdy progress in the direction of abolishing of such arms can help address these global problems. Technical and political skills gained through drafting treaties to verify the abolition of nuclear arms can offer robust models and know-how to solve other international threats (Müller, 2011). Complete abolition of these weapons may not be implemented in Obama’s lifetime but can be used as a form of international cooperation that may be essential in managing other challenges. More so, the abolition of nuclear arsenals will enable technical, intellectual and financial resources dedicated to nuclear threats to be diverted to other uses such as resolving transnational conflicts faced by all nations (Futter, 2009). Resources may also be focused towards national development, including agricultural production, development of clean energy and water. Nuclear weapons put present and future generations at risk as they hold inescapable global security problems. It is also likely that conflicts will persist even after nuclear weapons are abolished. Therefore, each year that passes will raise the need to back Obama’s idea of nuclear weapon free world.
Disadvantages
Nuclear weapons can hamper the development of positive relations, which is the main idea in Obama’s doctrine. This is reflected in former rivals such as the US and Russia; the two countries have been experiencing wobbly progress in the establishment of a positive relationship since the culmination of the cold war. Regarding the current nuclear posture introduced by Obama, it seems to be completely out of step with respect to Russia. For instance, in 1994, Russia and the US had a two-pronged de-targeting settlement, which highlighted that, for the first time in history since the emergence of the nuclear era; the two countries would not use nuclear weapons in a way that postulates they are rivals (Lonsdale, 2013). However, if Russia is not presumed as a possible antagonist, then three of the recent basic features of the US nuclear policy makes little sense.
First, the force is extensive, without targeting Russia’s strategic military; there are few viable aim-points for US nuclear weapon that would need 1500-2000 weapons. For instance, in a life-threatening crisis, only 50-100 nuclear arms would be required to threaten US rivals such as North Korea and Iran. Only Russia’s sizeable nuclear force has justified US forces as it totals to thousands. Secondly, altered weapons would not be needed. Historically, only Russia can obstruct the launch of US nuclear weapons by devastating a considerable percentage of them (Futter & Zala, 2013). Finally, US nuclear munitions would not require the operative aptitude to reduce damage in their country by rescinding the Russian nuclear arms at their safeguarded stations before launching.
The incapability of the two countries to make quick progress on plummeting nuclear weapons has resulted in continued misunderstandings and distrust. America’s retention of considerable nuclear defenses even as it creates deliberate missiles for military protection, leaves Russia questioning America’s intents. Russia’s maintenance of numerous old non-strategic nuclear arms gives rise to related questions amongst the NATO associates. The type of US-Russian association and the aggressive nuclear tangle by the two states hampers the development of normalized dealings. For instance, there is no captivating reason as to why the Russian nuclear defenses and the US could not be securely disengaged, with every single country getting back to their premeditated comfort zone. However, the problem is that the US perceives Russia as a possible threat despite contrary declarations. This restricts their readiness to build down US nuclear counter defense system, which causes them to encourage the retention of the significant US defenses for possible attacks. However, recent studies show that even if Russia increases its nuclear forces more than the US, the survivable portion of US forces would still have the ability to attack Russia with a devastating response(Futter & Zala, 2013). The deterrence of nuclear forces has many costs including hindering the development of positive relations between America and Russia as well as other nuclear-armed nations.
Absence of warfighting
The US nuclear posture is multi-dimensional; the most visible role of the strategy is deterring nuclear attacks on the US and its partners or allies. Since deterrence is based on the credibility of the threat posed, proclaiming a war-fighting standpoint makes the danger more plausible. Credibility based on warfighting capability enables the means to control escalation and damage limitation it also facilitates victory. Warfighting is more than encouraging deterrence. It is crucial for limiting damage in case nuclear conflicts occur. If deterrence fails, the goal must be to minimize destruction to the United States as well as its allies (Lonsdale, 2013). In case of war, along with active and passive safety measures, a counterforce troop will be necessary. Nuclear forces from the enemy’s side may have to be destroyed, and a positive post-conflict outcome should be pursued. Termination of positive conflict may give rise to the need for a theory of victory, which will, in turn, require highly developed warfighting techniques and willingness to carry out the plans. As such, a war-fighting stance is important as it supports a deterrence posture and in case prevention fails, it may bring out the variation between survival and ruin.
Lack of Escalation Control
Escalation dominance demands that a state has the will and capability to defeat the enemy. This concept is based on a range of interconnected military skills. Under the Nuclear Review Posture proposed by the Obama’s administration, the US may have the ability to operate higher levels of nuclear conflicts but does not appear to have the will to act along the whole spectrum of feasible nuclear options. This is facilitated by the lack of positive strategic approaches to nuclear arms. In this respect, the Obama’s administration took a step backward from previous presidential eras where a range of operations was developed to counter threats that arose from the complex security environment (Lonsdale, 2013). While the United States continued to minimize nuclear warheads and freeze upcoming weapons, modernization and proliferation of existing ones increased dramatically. However, the Obama’s administration acknowledged the trend and remained hopeful that its nationalistic opinion would turn the tide of universal opinion. Nuclear weapons can cause massive destruction; nonetheless, it does not mean that a country should leave itself without a comprehensive/ mature nuclear strategy. In case deterrence fails, a determined nuclear-armed enemy may overpower a state with an underdeveloped nuclear plan.
Misdirected self-assurance in other forms of Technological Stability
Concerning the nuclear strategy, the Obamas administration fell into the trap of seeking security via stability with respect to Russia. The Nuclear Review posture attempted to establish strategic stability with the former adversary. The primary variables in the pursuit of stability were quality, quantity and the functionality of nuclear arms. The deterrence on the development of new weapons presented approaches to counteract possible areas of operational and technical tension between Russia and America. At some point, all these measures were aimed at reducing the susceptibility of retaliatory actions and minimizing the probability of unintended launch. The anti-nuclear stance also undermined the Obama’s administration quest for stability. Even if America accepted the problematic idea that stability is partially based on parity in the will, credibility and capability had to be part of the premise. As such, if one of the countries involved in the nuclear relationship has significant credibility problems then an imbalance is likely to occur and may compromise stability (Lonsdale, 2013). In this case, an imbalance regarding credibility seems to exist between America and Russia. Due to somewhat shortcomings in conventional armed forces, Russia has more weight on its nuclear competency. Contrary to the United States, Russia is open to using nuclear arms in any situation, including while fighting against other nuclear powers. Hence, it is apparent that there is an imbalance regarding the terms of credibility and will between the two nations. More so, the number of warheads between the two states may be the same, but Russia seems to be a stronger nuclear power than the US.
Demeaning the Utility of Nuclear Arms
Underselling nuclear weapons to a strategic role of preventing nuclear attack against the US and its allies downgrades the value of these weapons. This is crucial in complex security environments where nuclear arms could have key, although limited missions. It also draws attention to the error of eliminating capabilities, new tasks, and the development of weapons especially in the field of cleaner nuclear arms. Some of the problems that affect military performance include intelligence flops, enemy countermeasures and poor strategies (Lonsdale, 2013). Nuclear weapons, unlike conventional weapons, have a higher potential for hitting the destruction targets. It is possible that a scenario could in future face US where a weapon of mass destruction requires to be neutralized within a short time. In fact, whether it may be intended or not, Nuclear Posture review would appear to support this idea with an increased emphasis on the danger that arises from weapons of mass destruction. However, in this case, nuclear arms would provide the best opportunity to destroy the target before losing from the intelligence radar. Thus, the development of cleaner and low-yield nuclear weapons would provide a priceless capability in such a situation. By deterring the growth of new nuclear arms, the Obama administration limited the flexibility of the US nuclear strategy.
Future Trends on the US Nuclear Policy and Security
Although the number of nuclear arms across the world has significantly reduced from the high levels that existed in the cold war, there is still a possibility that these weapons might still be used. The horizontal spread of nuclear technology to more international actors has created a new situation for US nuclear planers, where values of rationality and mutually assured destruction are no longer unchallengeable (Pifer et al., 2010). The increased risk that rogue states may acquire and use these weapons has created a situation that the US should consider. Thus, the nuclear policy of deterring nuclear weapons and preventing their proliferation is still vital to the US foreign policy as well as the international security. Obama recognized this policy, steered towards nuclear reduction, substitution, and preventing their spread, represents a logical attempt to attempt to address the dynamic nature of the nuclear risk to the US security. In this sense, the former US president tried to deal with the nuclear threat by pursuing the reduction of the arms with Russia signing the New START treaty. He also reignited nuclear non-proliferation by minimizing US reliance on the weapons, made changes on the US declaratory policy and worked wholeheartedly in support of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (Pifer et al., 2010). All these efforts were a prudent attempt to get in terms with the changing realities in the US government and the types of security problems that US policymakers experience in the international climate. However, the move by the Obama administration subjects the country to more severe attacks in the future since the nuclear abolishment policy renders the country powerless in case of escalation of a conflict. This is because nuclear weapons are more powerful than conventional weapons and would be the best option in case a weapon of mass destruction requires to be neutralized within a short time.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is evident that Obama’s desire to restore good relations as per his doctrine raises some concerns. On the positive side, reviewing the nuclear posture to prevent a nuclear attack in future yields several positive outcomes such as the introduction of weapons of acceptable risk. Nuclear war can result in massive destruction of life and property. It would also help avoid Nuclear accidents, disasters, malfunctions and false alarms usually as a result of human error or mechanical problems related to nuclear weapons Deterrence of the weapons was important, as it would restrain possible threats to the security of the US. The Nuclear Review Posture by Obama was the most effective tool that has ever been developed to prevent war between the US and other nuclear-armed countries. Nuclear deterrence would induce more caution during crises thus making leaders more hesitant to take military action. As a result, warring nations may be prompted to resolve their conflicts before it escalates to more adverse military exchanges.
Obama’s commitment to obtain good relations with other nations through deterrence of nuclear weapons is also advantageous in the sense that, it would help reduce aggression between great powers. However, in a bid to restore good relations through the elimination of nuclear weapons, the US would be disadvantaged in a way. For instance, nuclear weapons can hamper the development of positive relations, which is the main idea in Obama’s doctrine. This is reflected in former rivals such as the US and Russia; the two countries have been experiencing wobbly progress in the establishment of a positive relationship since the culmination of the cold war. Also, reviewing the nuclear posture would result in the absence of warfighting, which is vital in the sense that it limits more damage in case nuclear conflicts. More so, the abolition of nuclear weapons may lead to the absence of an escalation control whereby in case deterrence fails, a determined nuclear-armed enemy may overpower a country with an underdeveloped nuclear strategy.
Abolishing nuclear weapons would demean the value of nuclear weapons especially in their strategic role of preventing nuclear attack against the US and its allies who face a complex security environment. Further, the nuclear review posture would lead to misdirected self-assurance in other forms of technological stability since an imbalance regarding credibility seems to exist between America and Russia. Russia has placed greater weight on its nuclear capability than the United States, as such, the country is open to using nuclear arms in any situation, including while fighting against other nuclear powers. Finally, the former US president’s move to reduce nuclear proliferation represents a logical attempt in helping the world realize the risk of nuclear weapons. However, although the number of nuclear arms across the world has reduced significantly from the high levels that existed in the cold war, there is still a possibility that these weapons might still be used. As such, the nuclear review posture by the Obama administration weakened the US security system as the country might not be in a position to fight back using nuclear weapons in case an enemy overpowers them.
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