Human Rights And Religious Tolerance

Human Rights and Religious Tolerance

Introduction

As already mentioned, the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms are rights inherent to the human being for the simple fact of being, so on numerous occasions and irremediably, he will be affected in relations with his environmentsocial, and consequently it will also be visible in the workplace.

Developing a work activity in a company with an alienity cannot mean an incursion in the exercise of this right, however, we have to clarify, that today, the content of the latter can be alleged not only by the worker with theaim that their rights are respected, but also by the employer with an opposite objective, when their right is included in the so -called ideological or tendency companies, which under this qualifier, have been protected in making decisions harmful to the workerunder the prism of the incompatibilities created between business principles and the personal sphere this.

Developing

For all this, in the development of this relationship, on numerous occasions, a modulation is required between the obligations derived from the employment contract itself and the principle of business freedom, even more, when the worker intends to exercise this right based on a situationof subordination with respect to the employer, it is here that business power must be analyzed and weighted, with respect to the use of religious symbology in the workplace.

Today, due mainly to the creation of numerous multicultural societies, the result of migratory flows and global globalization, more and more cases are, where workers where they are located, feel that need to manifest their religious convictions, for thethat conflicts between the rights of workers and those of the company are more frequent, creating situations of discrimination that are not always protected and protected by law.

It is in this context, where the ECHR, has established a repeated thesis, which divides the exercise of the right to religious freedom into two dimensions: an intern, which places it in the field of beliefs and personal and individual intimacy of each, and that in any way it must be violated, nor should any intrusion suffer by the employer, nor before, that is, during the personnel selection process, or during the employment relationship, and not even, after the same way.

All this, involves the entrepreneur, mere tolerance and with respect as the right covered by law in all its dimensions, both international and national, will be reference as close as a close text, the same article of 16.2 of our Spanish Constitution, and as it also comes to reflect the STC Judgment 19/1985, of February 13, 1985, thus understanding that for the exercise of this right, the company is an external and alien element, since the exerciseFrom it, it would not have to imply any type of adaptation, dialogue or consensus, between worker and entrepreneur.

And an external, which as its name indicates, consists in the externalization of these convictions, either with the practice of worship and the celebration of their festivities, such as, in the use of representative clothing of their religion or visibly carrying a visibly certain religious symbols,as badges, brooches or jewels that are intimately linked to them. This manifestation is the most problematic, being actually the one that usually generates the birth of the conflict.

With the judgment object of this work, which is that of the European Court of Human Rights (Section 4.ª), of January 15, 2013, Eweida and others, against the United Kingdom, we will analyze four cases, where the expression of this religious feeling of the worker can lead to create conflict situations with the company for religious reasons.

The judgment, is made up of four pronouncements, since its origin is four lawsuits filed against the United Kingdom and Ireland of the North, by virtue of article 34 of the European Agreement, by four British citizens, ladies Nadia Eweida, Shirley Chaplin, LillianLadle and Mr. Gary McFarlane.

These citizens claim the high court, that protection on their right to express their religion, that their own internal legislation does not grant them, for not properly protecting the exercise of the same, supporting their argument in article 9 CEDH, in some cases, asonly reason, or together with the article, 14 of the same text.

Of these four cases, two, which are those referring to the case of ladies Nadia Eweida and Shirley Chaplin, arise when the company limits the expression of its faith, carried out visibly, by carrying a religious symbol such as the cross;And two others, those of Mrs. Ladle and Mr. McFarlane, who goes beyond the mere exhibition of an object, since it affects the work they must carry out, conflicting with the interests of third parties,And having as a consequence, the imposition of sanctions by the company.

To better understand the pronouncements of the sentence, we will explain succinctly, the facts of each of the assumptions. First, we will explain the case of Mrs. Eweida. The Mrs. Eweida, is a practitioner of Copto Christianity. Since 1999 he has been working for the British Airways airline, that is, he works for a private company. British Airways, requires all those employees who have direct contact with the public, carrying a uniform. 

Until 2004, the women’s uniform included a high -neck blouse, and since 2004, this blouse was changed to an open neck, which should be used along with a knotted handkerchief. Together with these changes, his own use policy was established, with detailed rules about each aspect of the uniform. 

With respect to female accessories, the company established, that any jewel or religious complement that it would like to carry, should be covered by the uniform, or in case it was not possible, permission should be asked from the company. Taking into account that previously, Sijs men had already been authorized, put a turban, and Muslim women take veil.

Well, until May 2006, Mrs. Eweida was carrying a cross covered by the uniform, and from that date, he decides to take it visibly, so he receives an attention call from the airline, before what she gives reluctantly, until in September, reappear with the cross to carry it permanently and visible, to which the company decides to suspend it of employment and salary until deciding to abide by the standards

Given this, a few days later, the company offers an administrative work in which it does not have to be facing the public and without any restrictions, but, even so, Mrs. Eweida rejects the offer.

In the middle, the case was made public, and the company decidedcarry religious symbols when they were authorized, although in the case of the Cross, it did not require such authorization. For all this, the Mrs. Eweida, returned to her job in the month of February, but the company, refused to compensate for the time she was without going to her job by own decision.

Given this, we could understand that Mrs. Eweida, could give his claim to be fulfilled through the recognition that the company made of its right, but nothing is further from reality, since its journey began by the national courts until it reached the ECHR. First he filed a claim before the Labor Court, based on damages for indirect discrimination and the violation of article 9 of the ECHR, which was rejected by the Court, understanding that the cross was not a sine qua non requirement to express the Christian faith. 

Given this, he went to the Labor Court of Appeal, which again rejected his claims, and among his arguments he referred to the fact that the indirect discrimination alleged in the claim had not been accredited, continuing with the appeal before the Court of Appeal, which againHe dismissed her, supporting her arguments in a sentence of the House of Lores that established that:

 “Strasbourg institutions are not ready to rule an interference in the right to manifest a religious belief in practice or observance when a person has voluntarily accepted a job and that there are other means for that person to practice or observe their religion withoutdifficulties or inconveniences ". 

Until finally, he went to the Supreme Court, which denied him permission to appeal. He has voluntarily accepted a job and that there are other means for that person to practice or observe their religion without difficulties or inconveniences ”. Until finally, he went to the Supreme Court, which denied him permission to appeal. He has voluntarily accepted a job and that there are other means for that person to practice or observe their religion without difficulties or inconveniences ”. Until finally, he went to the Supreme Court, which denied him permission to appeal.

conclusion

At this point, I would like to make an subsection, to show what has already been reviewed previously in this work in a practical way, which is the need to exhaust the prior judicial route in the country where the right has been violated before being able to goto the ECHR, as stated in article 35 of the European Regulations for Human Rights, and as we have seen in the case of Mrs. Eweida, first attending the Labor Court, the Labor Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal, until reaching the Supreme Court, becoming this fact, a fundamental requirement of admissibility of the appeal.

In the second case, we find that the appellant, Mrs. Chaplin, was a practicing Christian woman, who works in a public hospital, specifically in the geriatrics room, and who carried a chain around her neck from her childhood as an expression of her belief. The hospital had a uniform policy, in which it was specified, that jewelry items were taken should be discreet and in the case of necklaces or chains, they were directly prohibited to reduce the risk of injuries when manipulating thepatients. Well, with the change of uniformity, the bats included a V neck for nurses, so the cross of the Mrs. C