Immanuel Kant Theory

Immanuel Kant theory

Introduction

The place of aesthetic theory in Kant’s philosophy as a whole: judgment as an intermediary. On the one hand, the aesthetic theory developed by Kant in the first part of his criticism of the trial, admits to be treated as a complete and independent part within his philosophy, so there is a risk of distorting a speech that aims to be very concrete. However, the conviction that the full understanding of a matter will only be achieved if due attention to those elements immediately beyond their confines, permeable as they are usually in philosophy.

Developing

As much as an unfathomable abyss between the mastery of the concept of nature, such as the sensitive, and the mastery of the concept of freedom, as the supra sensitive, in such a way that it is not possible from the first domain to the second (Through the theoretical use of reason), as if they were two worlds totally different from which the former cannot have any influence on the second, despite everything, this should have some influence on that. In other words, the concept of freedom must make effective in the supra world the end given through its laws.

Therefore, nature must also be thought of in such a way that compliance with laws in its form is at least with the possibility of the purposes to be carried out according to the laws of freedom. Thus, there must be a foundation for the unity between the supra sensitive that underlies nature and the supra sensitive that the concept of freedom entails practically, so that, even if neither theoretical nor is a knowledge of such concept andTherefore it does not possess its own domain, despite everything possible the transit of the way of thinking according to the principles of the one towards the way of thinking according to the principles of the other.

In response to this, the intermediate position of the power to feel pleasure or displace. The same table establishes three powers to know: understanding, judgment and reason. And this again seems to insinuate a mediation by the judgment between understanding and reason, in addition to relating it to feeling for its analogous position. If, in the criticism of pure reason, Kant investigated the categories and principles a priori of understanding (the framework through which it opens to nature and enables its knowledge).

And in the criticism of practical reason, he intended to demonstrate the existence of an a priori principle of pure reason in practical use, it is now the turn to wonder if “discernment, which constitutes an intermediate term between reason and understanding,It also has its principles a priori and if they are constitutive or simply regulatory, as well as finding out if the discernment gives a priori the rule to the feeling of pleasure and displacement, as an intermediate term between the power to know and to desire ”. Thus, if the power to judge is related to feeling analogous to the way in which understanding is related to the power to know and pure reason.

 In practical use, with the power to desire, the criticism of the trial will prove to be more than an integral part of criticism. Now, what is Kant referring when he speaks of the power to judge? The answer is given under the fourth epigraph of the introduction: ‘Discernment in general is the power to think about the particular content under the universal’ ’. Particular under a given law (in which case it will be decisive) or only the particular is given, and must seek the universal (being then a reflexive judgment). In the first case, the universal is nothing other than the categories and a priori principles of understanding that were subject to study in the criticism of pure reason:

As well as laws that "only concern in general the possibility of a nature (as the object of the senses)". But there are obviously other equally necessary laws that are not given with the structure of this power to know, such as the laws of physics. These must be discovered, being empirical and (at least for us) contingent, but are not given to us either after the mode of the objects we experience. Ascend to them is the function of the reflexive judgment, which Kant makes dependent on a heuristic principle: the assumption of nature as an intelligible unit.

conclusion

Our aspirations to the knowledge of nature are not limited to an accumulation of individuals or independent general laws, but have systematic eagerness. This objective, according to Kant, is the assumption that private empirical laws participate in a whole that is as “if an understanding (although not ours) had given them to our cognitive abilities, to make possible a system of a system ofExperience according to particular laws of nature ". This principle of the reflexive judgment cannot be taken from experience, since its mission is precisely fundamental the unity of the laws of nature. This makes it transcendental, but, unlike the a priori principles that guide the understanding, their function is not constitutive, but regulatory.