Critical Analysis of Pity of War by Niall Ferguson

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A Critical Analysis of the Pity of War by Niall
One of the greatest aspects of the book, which demands a great deal of attention is the apparent uniqueness. A lot has been questioned regarding its thrilled denunciation of established wisdom, just as much as the confidence and vigor though Niall Ferguson describes the controversial case. Based on the controversies, one may be moved to establish the existence of the book had Niall not been engrossed in the banking history, or had he not been a Conservative party member during the Thatcher eras. Moreover, many are likely to be curious regarding the tone of his creation given that he is an individual from the Oxbridge system, which values aphorism and paradox as human wisdom epitome. Even though there is a likelihood that the book could still exist, it is challenging to establish the impacts of these aspects to its establishment.
The arguments by Niall are rarely accepted by the mainstream. A greater percentage of these objections and second thoughts are probably driven by Niall’s intelligence and historical interests evident from his confident predictions. In one of the predictions, Niall claims that the Germans never won the war because the British Expeditionary had been sent (458). Moreover, Niall also suggests that had Britain stayed out of the war just for a matter of weeks; entire continental Europe could have been transformed into something different from the current European Union (459).

It needs not to be told that establishing the strengths and weaknesses of these predictions is far from possibility.
The first part of the prediction tends to rule out a great deal of the relevant impossibility literature of the Schlieffen plan, just as much as the astonishing preparedness of the French novices to bleed and die for the republic. The British Expeditionary Force, as placed by Niall, did not bar the Germans incursion of France; and instead, was an inconsequential element in the Franco-German massacre. Arguably, these are negligible lies and should not distract a more significant issue. Niall’s prediction, however, is so confident yet goes beyond any available evidence probably not known by any single individual.
The second prediction, on the other hand, appears to inform the reader that had Britain remained out of the war, the European Union would have been established at some earlier stages of the century. Moreover, the second prediction tends to suggest that the European Community could have been without the ambiguous attenuation of the British power consequent which has ever since brought about losses of both material and human lives. This prediction, is arguably significant to Niall’s conservative project, is quite breathtaking in its daring and sweep. The statement resembles two distinct vectors; a descending one, which describes the British power, and an ascending one, which illustrates the German power. Niall seems to suggest that without the war, the Germans would still hold the dominant positions they hold today, and that Britain would not be in the marsh which they have relegated themselves to through the squandering of its manpower and assets on a pointless and avoidable conflict, an aspect which Niall describes as the biggest mistake of the modern history (462).
The problems related to such forms of reasoning are also in other areas of the book. Niall mentions that the Liberal cabinet was divided during the war crisis of 1914. He then goes to the dark by claiming British cabinet decided to support Grey because they feared being removed from office and Tories taking over (443). This is brought up as the main reason for Britain going to war, and then suggesting the British government decided to shift the continental war to a world war. These statements and predictions are in no close to being real predictions as they fail to specify the millions of intervening variables that are impacting on the projections. They are therefore questionable and scarcely contribute to the knowledge and understanding of the historical change and historical processes.
In another instance, Niall claims that the aim of the Germans in the war without the interference of Britain would have brought about less grandiose (169). The truth of this statement cannot be established. Niall also suggests that the primary reason for many Britain volunteers to the war was attributed to unemployment. Arguably, the prediction may be of a truthful nature attributed to the likelihood that deflation can cause joblessness. However, joblessness, post the war, could lead to stability and is a matter of pure assumption in the wavy democracy after the war. There are many variables unknown to the reader to make the statements any useful.
Apparently, there have to be multiple viewpoints to Niall’s creation, and it is proper to acknowledge that these issues can be seen in a variety of ways. For instance, one could choose to accept that had Britain remained neutral, more so after the cabinet vote, which was won by the war party, many things would be different. However much there are still many assumptions to be made, Niall’s argument seems to suggest that the British, having not been involved in the war, would not have been disrupted by the fast rates of German success. In the end, it would have required the British policymakers to simply stand aside and allow the establishment of German domination on the continent and it would then be easy to be involved in the balance of power negotiations. Furthermore, even if we accept Niall’s interpretation of the supposed proceedings of the war despite what appears to have been an easy victory for the Germans; it is still critical to be informed of the brittleness of history.
There are a lot of predictions and statements mentioned by Niall that have insufficient data to assist in their justification. Majority of the variable are not known, thereby making it difficult for any reader to regard the statements as necessary. When not involved in aspects of such intense speculative history, Niall offers a book constituted of marvelous explanations regarding aggravated questions as in line with World War I. The chapters on morale and issues of surrendering are, arguably, of a first-rate whereas the explanations on accounts of myths regarding the war fervor demand respect. Another fascinating chapter deals with the national sides of the war, but are not the reasonably well-compacted routes of fashion and famine, suppers and suppliers, during a period of shortage and war. Instead, Niall scrutinizes the home front propaganda and does it through popular opinion and journalism as the medium. Besides, Niall’s treatment of the propaganda and press go way beyond the preceding propagandists’ accounts as the reading public and puppeteers.
Work Cited
Ferguson, Niall. The pity of war: Explaining world war I. Hachette UK, 2008.