Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Student’s Name
Instructor’s Name
Course Details
Date
LEATHERMAN et al.v.TARRANT COUNTY NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATION UNIT et al.
No. 91-1657.Argued January 12, 1993.
Decided March 3, 1993.
Facts
The plaintiffs moved the court on the grounds that the defendants acted negligently in executing searches in their various homes. The appellants were of the view that the search conducted in their premises violated that 4th Amendment of the United States of America Constitution (Leatherman 1). The court of appeals had changed the pleading standard as laid out in section 1983; hence the pleadings by the plaintiffs did not meet the “heightened pleading standard” as required by the fifth circuit of appeal judges (Leatherman 1). The subordinate court found for the respondents, on appeal, the fifth circuit of appeals upheld the district court’s decision hence this suit (Leatherman 1).
Issue
The issue that was found worth deliberating on by the supreme court of the United States of America was, whether it was proper for the federal court to apply a “heightened pleading standard” in the case that was instituted by the plaintiffs (Leatherman 1). The “heightened pleading standard” was more wanting than that borne in the federal rules of civil procedure for civil rights cases that cited municipal responsibility. Section 1983 applied to civil rights cases where liabilities fall within the demarcations of 42 USC s1983.
Holding/Rationale
The Supreme Court ruled for the appellants.

The Supreme Court in a unanimous delivered by Rehnquist held that a federal court cannot apply a “heightened pleading standard” as this was in contravention of the federal rules of civil procedure (Leatherman 3). The federal rules of civil procedure (FRCP) outline that a pleading should contain only a brief and precise wording projecting the pleader to be entitled to a relief before the approached court.
The defendants in the appeal before the Supreme Court cited that they had freedom from respondeat superior liability hence immunity from being sued. The court found that such argument was wrongly placed as the respondents’ misconstrued freedom from liability as immunity from suits. In addition, the Supreme Court found that the fifth circuit’s demand of a ‘heightened’ pleading was a contradiction to FRCP (Blum 22). The fifth circuit’s level of pleading is difficult to square with the moderate structure of “notice pleading” as set up FRCP. FRCP does allow for better exactitude in certain occurrences as they are detailed and of that of clearing municipalities from legal battles was not among the itemized exceptions.
Opinion
The decision of the Supreme Court was just given the circumstances of the suit. A municipality will hide behind the wall of not being liable to cause atrocities to the public if all the officers acting will cite working under official capacity (Blum 15). If the court were to uphold the decision of the appeals court, then the public would have no way to protect themselves from municipalities when they infringe on constitutional safeguards of the public.
The matter before the court was beyond just the determination of a mere suit but hearing of an appeal that touched on federal laws that did contravene the constitutional right of fair hearing and the 4th amendment (Cottrell 76). These are matters of public interest hence the reason why the court chose to listen to the suit. Court decisions that impact of the grand norm are matters to be determined by the Supreme Court where the appeal is on error of law.

Works Cited
Blum, Karen M. “Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After Leatherman?.” Cath. UL Rev. 44 (1994): 39.
Cottrell, Eric Harbrook. “Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes a Look at Heightened Pleading Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit.” NCL Rev. 72 (1993): 1085.
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1993).