The Arab Spring

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The Arab Spring
Political scientists have considered popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East (referred herein as Arab Spring) as the most violent movements in the Arab World in the recent years. Driven by the desire for freedom of expression, social justice, economic opportunities and dignity, young people organized protests against the incumbent leaders (Thiel 43).According to Thiel, Mohamed Bouaziz’s self-immolation after the receiving mistreatment from the local government officials angered many young people in the town of Sidi Bouzid who reacted by initiating massive protests against the incumbent leadership. In early 2011, the situation degenerated into a revolution as various groups of violent protesters emerged around the country, resulting in the ouster of President Ben Ali. The revolutionary ideals spread to neighboring nations such as Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, among others. Some of these revolutionary movements succeeded in their causes as in the case of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. In other countries, the uprisings failed due to several factors unique to each country involved. The paper will investigate the reasons for the failure of the Arab Spring in Jordan and Morocco as well as conduct a comparative analysis of factors for the failure of the Arab Spring revolutions in mentioned nations.
Background of the Arab Spring
The revolution involving the Arab world caught many social and political scientists by surprise.

There were no indications whatsoever that there would be an outbreak of uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East (Thiel 43).Thiel observes that the position of social and political scientists regarding the stability of the Arab world originated from the understanding that Arab leaders wielded so much power over the citizens that they would succeed in repulsing any attempts of revolutionary uprisings. For instance, most of the leaders of countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain had been under a single leadership for decades. As Thiel (43-44) explains, the resilience of the Arab aristocracy over internal discord had been considered unbreakable. Many attempts for revolutions had been made but failed because of several factors relating the dictatorial tendencies of Arab governments at the time. However, some of the reasons given by the political scientists in regards to the failure of previous efforts to revolt against dictatorship became apparent in some countries as the revolution progressed. These factors will be the area of focus in the subsequent sections of the paper.
The Failure of the Arab Spring in Morocco
Morocco is one of the Arab countries that managed to stop the spread of revolutionary ideals of the Arab Spring. Like other Arab nations, the Moroccan revolution embodied revolutionary ideas that sought to alter the relationship between the citizens and the state on the one hand and the state’s determination to cling to a governance structure as a way of sustaining order and prosperity (Kalpakian 2-3).Such conflicting philosophy of government was responsible for citizens’ decision to embrace the events that were taking place in the neighboring nations. Despite its spirited start, the movement fizzled out due to several factors.
The revolutionary movement in Morocco lacked a unified message in terms of perception regarding what constituted better leadership and repression. According to El Amraou (22 Feb 2016, Aljazeera), the movement did not have similar ideologies relating to leadership. During the 20th February 2011 movement (F20M), several participants in the street protests of Rabat showed support for the monarchy. Such support indicated that despite the economic challenges and limitations of fundamental rights and freedoms, some Moroccans still had trust in King Mohammed IV as the ideal leader to lead the country towards democratization and prosperity. Daadaoui (Feb 24, 2016, Huffington Post) argues that leaders of the movement failed to offer an alternative cultural discourse compared to the cultural capital that the state and the monarchy held over Moroccan populations. Additionally, the institution of the monarchy had so much penetrated its political culture in the Moroccan society that the people could not consider the possibility of a stable country in the absence of the king. For this reason, the moral standing of the monarchy in a traditional perspective was not affected significantly by the revolutionary sentiments. In effect, the citizens held that the state was better-placed to offer a cultural discourse which Moroccans had preferred for many years before the outbreak of the uprising.
On the same note, ideological uniformity was a significant ingredient to the success of the revolutionary movement in Tunisia and Egypt (Berg and Rossi-Doria 199).El Amraou (22 Feb 2016, Aljazeera) agrees with this position when he observes that the failure of the F20M had a lot do with the lack of a common mentality. According to Berg and Rossi-Doria (199-200) the disconnect the between various groups of protesters was due to the different perceptions held by such groups regarding governance and prosperity. As a result, the groups and communities involved in the protests could not form a strong base of ideas that would advocate for the removal of the political establishment.
The relationships and attitudes between the rural and urban communities played a significant role in diffusing anti-revolutionary sentiments. The mentioned groups held different interpretations of what constituted good governance (Berg and Rossi-Doria 199).According to Berg and Rossi-Doria, while the F20M made significant efforts to mobilize rural populations for its cause, the rural movements did not put as much effort to mobilize the rural folk behind the ideologies of the F20M.The apathy towards the movement stemmed from the passivity of the rural areas towards politics. Since Morocco’s independence, the there had been systematic political strategies to isolate the rural areas from politics. Such strategies were characterized by brutal response of the state security apparatus to revolts that often occurred in the rural areas after independence (Berg and Rossi-Doria 201-02).These historical tendencies for the rural populations to remain aloof from the national politics played against the F20M efforts to galvanize rural support.
Still, on the issue of division, the organizers of protests lacked unity and a clear strategy to mobilize people across all regions of the country. Daadaoui (Feb 24, 2016) argues that F20M did not have a clear organization strategy; they leaders assumed a centrifugal leadership strategy and also pursued a horizontal mobilization strategy. The mentioned approaches led to disagreements among the various stakeholders such the illegal Islamist movement of al-‘Adl. The differences allowed the state to devise a strategy that infiltrated and immobilized the different groups that were involved in the protests (Berg and Rossi-Doria 204).
The rural-urban differences were also seen in their attitudes towards certain issues affecting the country. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the rural areas had been isolated from the political discourse since independence. Such marginalization led to widespread poverty and limited economic opportunities. Such situation explains the demands of economic opportunities advocated by the rural populations during the movement. On the other hand, the wealthy and educated urban population had high awareness in so far as good governance is concerned. The group consisted of individuals who were more informed about corruption, human rights violations, nepotism and social evils that the government of the king committed on its people. The level of awareness in urban populations was much higher compared with the high illiteracy areas levels in the countryside (Berg and Rossi-Doria 202).For this reason, the ideological views did not resonate well with the rural populations whose main concern was economic empowerment and not the leadership of the king.
Another advantage that enabled the government of King Mohammed to survive the revolutionary sentiments is the position of the monarchy in regards to religion. According to Daadaoui (Feb 24, 2016, Huffington Post), the regime of Mohamed IV monopolized religion which provided adequate safeguards against opposition forces. The Moroccan citizenry considered the monarch as the protector of the Islamic faith. Through the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, the monarch supervised mosques and other religious activities throughout the kingdom. The rural society also accepts the values of Islam, and the political vision of the monarch more than the discourse of political parties which were often interpreted as abstract and Western (Berg and Rossi-Doria 202-03; Kalpakian 2-8). Since the monarchical interpretation of faith dominates the country’s political discourse, the leadership held a lot of legitimacy among most Moroccans. As such, the high regard to Islamic faith discouraged people from revolting against such a treasure which was supervised by the monarch.
One of the reasons for the escalation of violence in Tunisia after the death of Bouaziz was the reaction of the state’s security apparatus towards the demonstrators in the small town of Sidi Bouzid. Instead of reaching out to the family of Bouaziz and investigate, the security personnel crashed protesters with brutality, encouraging further violence (Daadaoui Feb 24, 2016, Huffington Post).Conversely, the kingship in Morocco engaged the protestors and, through political maneuvers, introduced several changes that disorganized the revolutionary organizations as well as discouraged many young people from participating in the protests (Daadaoui Feb 24, 2016). For instance, the king facilitated a proactive political process that resulted in a referendum that created a new constitutional order in 2011.In the same year, the country participated in elections. Under the new constitution, the king was required to appoint the prime minister from the majority party in parliament unlike in the previous occasions where he would pick any individual for such position without consulting any authority. However, the king maintained considerable power over the affairs of the state. Despite the cosmetic nature of these reforms, a majority of the citizens believed that genuine were reforms being implemented, thereby abandoning their quest for political changes (Berg and Rossi-Doria 202-04).The issue of reforms also received a wider acceptance due to previous efforts to bring institutional changes in the country. According to Berg and Rossi-Doria (202-04), reforms began in Morocco in 1999 after King Mohammed ascended to the throne. Although there were few reforms that the king’s leadership had introduced by the start of the uprising, the Moroccan society had a history of active movements that often conducted demonstrations. Such environment accorded people more freedom to protest whenever they disagreed with the actions of the state. This political climate was not available in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya where the revolution succeeded. In the mentioned countries, protests were quelled with extreme brutality.
Reasons for the Failure of the Arab Spring in Jordan
Researchers and political scientists acknowledge that the response of King Abdullah played a significant role in averting a full-blown uprising in Jordan. According to Beck and Huser (85-86), the security agencies responded with the minimal force which prevented further escalation of violence. Violent riots and protests were a rare occurrence in the Arab Spring protests. During the entire 2011, only a single case of death was reported to have occurred from the protests. Except for the 2012 clashes between security agencies and protesters, other protests were peaceful and organized (Tobin 102-04). The peaceful response ensured that angry mobs did not gather to avenge themselves against security officers. Such confrontation would have heightened the tensions and further spread of political violence.
The response of the monarchy also entailed a series of political maneuvers which ensured that protesting groups were called for negotiations. After two weeks of protest, the king invited the Muslim Brotherhood leaders for negotiations about the various issues that were affecting Jordan (Bernstein 28). For instance, after taking note of the growing popularity of Islamists, the king established a collaborative relationship with the mentioned groups, avoiding further violence (Beck and Huser 86; Bernstein 28). As a result, some political and economic reforms were introduced by the government which created hope for a better and prosperous Jordan. For instance, in 2011, the prime minister was dismissed and replaced through a democratic process. The law was changed to allow the king to appoint the prime minister from the majority party in parliament. Also, the king directed various governments to introduce reforms as a response to the demands of the protestors (Beck and Huser 85).Although the political reforms did not remove a substantial amount of the king’s powers(Beck and Huser 85), the changes indicated a sign of commitment to introduce reforms. From the economic perspective, the government responded by introducing consumerist policies that were geared at distracting the middle-class Jordanians from issues that were threatening the political and economic stability of the country.
A low protester turnout was a major factor in the success for the government to succeed in preventing a crisis. As Beck and Huser (85) reveal, the total number of protesters averaged between 7,000 and 10,000, representing a small fraction of crowds compared to the large groups who participated in demonstrations in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. As such, the leaders did not acquire adequate support to launch nationwide disruptions. Scholars have attributed the few numbers to the diversity of the Jordanians regarding ethnicity and economic and social demands. Jordan was (and still is from the same perspective) a divided society. For instance, there was ambivalence among Palestinian Jordanians due to historical considerations of marginalization from the minority ruling elite from East Jordan. They argued that their voices would not be heard since the regime neglected non-indigenous Jordanians in the country’s economic discourse (Tobin 103-06).
External forces also played a vital role in distracting the attention of the protesters and entire citizenry of Jordon from engaging in protests. The kingdom exploited the volatile security situation in the region to perpetuate the status quo (Murad 9 Feb 2014, Aljazeera).According to Murad, an influx of refugees from the Syria and Iraq drifted attention of the government to the issues of refugees which slowed down protests. The events in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt resonated positively with the population who were reluctant to plunge their nation into a similar refugee crisis from within. Additionally, Palestinian Jordanians were not ready to protest without the involvement of indigenous Jordanians considering the situation in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt (Tobin 103-06).
The diplomatic relationships between Jordan and the West also acted as an external deterrent to a full-blown Jordanian uprising. According to Tobin (103-07), Jordanians believed that further efforts to depose King Abdullah could attract the intervention of the US who enjoyed a cordial relationship with the king. Such possibility discouraged protests in the sense that people feared an outbreak of a civil as was the case in Iraq and Syria.
Similarities of Moroccan and Jordanian Uprisings
Morocco’s uprising failed to degenerate into a full-scale revolution due to internal divisions. Rural populations protested against the economic marginalization and did not advocate for a regime change as a solution to the economic isolation that had affected rural residents for years whereas the urban population protested against corruption and repression. The urban protestors also advocated for a total regime change. Literacy differences between the rural Moroccans and urban protesters further fuelled the divisions. Moreover, al-‘Adl Islamist movement was infiltrated by the government, disrupting mobilization efforts (Berg and Rossi-Doria 201-04). As a result, rural populations did not support the mobilization efforts of urban protest organizers. Similarly, the multiethnic nature of the Jordanian society discouraged mass organization of protests. Palestinian Jordanians (who constitutes the majority ethnic group) showed a lack of will to protest due to the perception that their grievances would not be heard. They also feared of internal reprisals from the government due to their perceived ‘foreign’ tag among the Jordanian political elite (Tobin 96-99). Such apathy discouraged few indigenous Jordanians who had staged protests. Besides, the government infiltration of the Muslim Brotherhood weakened the demonstrations (Bernstein 28).
Government responses to the demands of the protesters played a crucial part in averting a political crisis both in Morocco and Jordan. The government of King Mohammed introduced changes to the appointment of the prime minister. A referendum and Elections were also held and more reforms were introduced. Similar strategies were used by King Abdullah where the prime minister was elected by parliament. Although reforms were introduced in both countries to appease the protesters, the changes were not enshrined in the constitution and, thus, enabled Mohammed and Abdullah to retain considerable powers in so far as governance was concerned (Berg and Rossi-Doria 201-05; Beck and Huser 84-87).
Reasonable freedom of expression in both Jordan and Morocco provided an atmosphere that averted chaos. Morocco had a history of protests where citizens launched protests against the state concerning governance matters. Such protests often happened in urban areas making security agencies more equipped to handle protesters through diplomatic means (Berg and Rossi-Doria 202-05).Likewise, the Jordanian public often negotiated with security agencies to conducting demonstrations. This historical tolerance to freedom of expression (which stemmed from the kingdom’s close connection with the West) led to much fewer deaths (only two persons reported to have died) during the demonstrations (Tobin 102-04; Beck and Huser 85-86). As a result, an escalation of violence which would have sparked a revolution did not occur.
The uprising in Jordan and Morocco protested against corruption, marginalization, and unemployment and was mostly organized by educated young people. Frustrated by the lack of economic opportunities, educated and urbanized young people mobilized populations through digital platforms such as Facebook and Twitter which attracted many protesters across their respective countries (Tobin 96-97; Daadaoui Feb 24, 2016).
Differences between Arab Spring in Morocco and Jordan
The reverence of the monarchy among the majority of Moroccans minimized the chances of a successful revolution. People, especially from the rural areas, regarded the monarchy as a spiritual symbol which made their protests to focus on economic opportunities as spearheaded by the king (Berg and Rossi-Doria 202-03; Daadaoui, 2016). On the contrary, Jordanians did not regard the kingship as a spiritual symbol of the country. The response of the king which involved negotiations and machinations attests to a concern of a possible revolt against the monarchy (Bernstein 28).
Jordan is composed of multiethnic groups of indigenous Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Iraqis, among other Arabic ethnicities (Tobin 96-97).The diversity played against mobilization efforts. According to Beck and Huser (85-86), the number of protesters in Jordan ranged between 7,000 and 10,000.The low turnout was attributed to the internal divisions that resulted from ethnic considerations. This low turnout instilled confidence in the security personnel who manipulated protesters through arrest and arraignment in court on trumped-up charges. Conversely, Morocco is a homogenous society. This feature promoted the unity of purpose in protests. Unlike the case of Jordan, Morocco’s demonstrations attracted at least 300,000 participants spread across various cities and rural towns (Berg and Rossi-Doria 203). Such a significant force prevented the police from using excessive force to disperse demonstrators.
External influences discouraged Jordanians from engaging in protests. For instance, the Jordanian public was aware of the political and economic linkages between the king and the West. As such, most of the citizens considered that Western allies would intervene if the leadership of King Abdullah were threatened. The possibility of war in the case of such scenario discouraged many protesters (Tobin 103-07).The influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq also acted as an external deterrent to the protests. In contrast, the failure of the Arab Spring in Morocco was an internal affair. The reverence of the monarchy and internal divisions worked against the efforts of the revolutionary movement.
Conclusion
The failure of the Arab Spring in Morocco and Jordan was a combination of government responses and internal factors that weakened the revolutionary efforts. Internal ethnic divisions in Jordan led to low turnouts in demonstrations. In Morocco, the ideological differences between the rural and urban protesters played against each other at the expense of the revolutionary movement. Also, the ‘diplomatic’ response from the security agencies towards demonstrators reduced chances of radical protests that would have degenerated into widespread chaos. An introduction of piecemeal reforms in both countries further decreased the intensity of the protests. However, in Jordan, external factors such as the king’s close relationship with the West and the Syrian refugee crisis worked against the cause of protesters. Overly, long-standing internal issues and lessons from Tunisia and Egypt averted full-blown uprising in Jordan and Morocco.

Works Cited
Beck, Martin, and Simone Hüser. “Jordan and the ‘Arab Spring’: No Challenge, No Change?” Middle East Critique, vol. 24, no. 1, 2015, pp. 83-97.
Bergh, Sylvia, and Daniele Rossi-Doria. Observing the Dynamics of Morocco’s ‘Arab Spring’ in the High Atlas.” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 20, no. 2, 2015, pp. 198-216.
Bernstein, Zoe. Stuck in a Jordanian Winter: Why the Arab Spring Failed to Result in Lasting Regime Change in Jordan. 2014. University of Colorado, Boulder, MS thesis. University of Colorado,
Daadaoui, Mohamed. “Morocco’s ‘Spring’ and the Failure of the Protest Movement.” The Huffington Post, [New York], 4 Feb. 2016.
“Here is how Jordan escaped the Arab Spring.” Nermeen Murad, Aljazeera, 9 Feb. 2014.
Kalpakian, Jack. “The Syrian and Moroccan Responses to the Arab Spring.” The Public Sector Innovation Journal, vol. 18, no. 1, 2013, pp. 1-20.
“My Arab Spring: Clinging to hope in Morocco.”Ahmed El Amraoui, Aljazeera, 22 Feb. 2016.
Thiel, Tobias. “Yemen’s Arab Spring: From Youth Revolution to Fragile Political Transition.” The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012, pp. 43-47, www.lse.ac.uk/.
Tobin, Sarah A. “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution.” Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 1, 2012, pp. 96-109.