week 6 quiz

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Week 6 Quiz
True A, False B
Part 1
1: Descartes argues that the cogito (I think, I am/exist) is the foundation for all subsequent knowledge because it…
A: provides an indubitable (indubitable = cannot be doubted) principle on which all other claims of knowledge can be based.
B: is the first necessary step in the method of doubt
C: can be doubted just as much as anything else we might claim to know.
D: all of the above.
Descartes used the word “cogito” to mean “I think, I am” as the unquestionable, axiomatic basis for his system of philosophy to offer unquestionable principle as the basis of all other claims of knowledge.
2. According to Descartes…
A: we cannot have knowledge of the external world (material objects).
B: he can prove that there is one thing we can know with absolute certainty–which is: “that we cannot know anything with certainty.”
C: the external world can be known through empirical investigation alone (knowledge is gained through the senses). 
D: we cannot say that we know things about the world based on sense experience because we can be deceived by our senses or might simply be dreaming.
According to Descartes, we receive the information through human senses which do not certainly have to be correct. Descartes reveals that no definite sign differentiates the dream experience from the waking experience.
3. According to G. E. Moore, it is acceptable to say that we know that there is an external world (outside of our ideas) even if it is logically possible that we could be dreaming or hallucinating.

A: True
B: False
The statement is true because the “external things” according to Moore is the set of space that occupies things that are unlikely to be perceived (Moore 290). Moore relates the statement with the dream argument to characterize the external things.
4. According to G. E. Moore, it is logically impossible (i.e., inconceivable) that we could be dreaming or hallucinating when we claim to know that there is an external world (i.e., outside of our ideas).
A: True
B: False
The statement is false because it could be true when individual dreams about something or even imagine the hands which render the person to think of seeing the hands falsely (Moore 292).
5. According to realist critics of skepticism (e.g., Moore), there is no way that we can really know whether there is an external world.
A: True
B: False
The statement is false because Moore defines the “external things” as a category of space that occupies things that could fail to be perceived (Moore 290). Moore considers bodily pains, double images, and after-images as “things” that could be presented in space.
6. According to Bertrand Russell
, when we look at an apple, we are directly aware of…
A: the apple itself (material object).
B: a certain smell, feel, color, and so on (sensations).
C: dream states caused by the mind of God.
D: none of these.
Russell reveals that when an individual grasps and eats an apple, the person could be aware of the green or red spherical shape with a specific feeling of smooth touch, and a consequent sweet sensation (Russell 159).
7. Philosophical skepticism, as it has been invoked epistemologically (in these readings) is defined as the doctrine that we have no knowledge of…
A: mathematics.
B: the external world.
C: anything.
D: our own thoughts.
For example, the doctrine of the epistemic status of any proposition is responsible for changing with contextually variable influences such as disciplinary or situational. Besides, the independence of such factors makes the proposition not to have epistemological realist asserts of the external world.
8. Skeptical doubts arise from the notion that knowledge requires…
A: certainty.
B: no justification.
C: logic.
D: memory.
Certainty has different meanings. For example, people believe that knowledge needs absolute certainty. The claim is in itself not sufficient to settle the existing dispute concerning certainty principle because knowledge is based on indefeasible and absolutely specific evidence.
9. According to Lorraine Code, traditional epistemological views (such as Descartes’ view) are problematic because of such views…
A: start from the assumption that men and women can both attain “real” knowledge
B: do not allow for the possibility that knowledge can be attained
C: are highly individualistic and do not take into consideration that knowledge is also a social enterprise.
D: all of the above.
For example, human individuality can sensibly be acknowledged as epistemologically substantial because it constitutes situations for the presence of knowledge and even determines the type of knowledge that needs to be achieved.
10. According to Code, certain claims about the knowledge men and women have such as the claim that `women are less objective/analytical than men and are thus cognitively defective’…
A: rely on essentialist assumptions about “natural or essential” differences between the sexes
B:  typically do not take into consideration that any differences may depend on social factors  [ such as the tendency to elevate certain kinds of knowledge (e.g., math or physics) and denigrate others (such as aesthetic or personal knowledge) ]
C: the differences may themselves be socially constructed.
D: all of the above.
For example, it is not true to say that women are not as good compared to their men counterparts in spatial skills including mathematics since mental rotation and organizations do not depend on the gender of the subject.
Short Answer
1. In a few sentences, briefly summarize traditional epistemological view(s) that Code is bringing into question (what is the general approach to epistemology that Code is rejecting). (Hint: in your answer, you should answer the following mini questions:) (100 to 150 words)
1) what is the traditional/historical (problematic) view about the difference between female or male knowledge?
Code reveals that the preliminary deliberations make of gender of the knower does not translate to a special instance of any central issue that is believed to run through the entire epistemological inquiry (Code 269). Code rejects the idea that science seems to offer an illustration of generalizations which is essential for epistemology. Besides, the doing of judgment which makes scientists reject the accepted theory that otherwise seems unacceptable based on the modest comparison of the theory with the world.
2) What does it mean to say that objectivity is a central epistemic value? What does “objectivity” mean in an epistemic context?
The concept that objectivity remains a central epistemic value means that it is firmly based on itself resulting in a substantial extent of diversity in the unity of knowledge. Objectivity in epistemic context means placement within a specific language as a subjective constraint on the possibility of complete fairness for knowledge overall (Code 273). For example, the historical accounts according to Code suggest that male knowledge can achieve, but female knowledge cannot attain the degree of objectivity.
2. According to Code, is there a moral-political element to epistemological inquiry? Explain your answer. What is a moral issue (or an issue about justice) that arises in regards to the epistemological difference that relates to the sex of the knower? Does this difference indicate any potential inequality? (100 to 150 words)
According to Code, the introduction of the moral-political aspect central to the epistemological inquiry is based on the political deliberations that raise apprehensions concerning the relevant features of the epistemic subjects that are presumed to generate stringent accountability necessities of which the knowers are required to be cognizant. A moral issue refers to differences in beliefs which are not necessarily a matter of partiality. For example, Code asks whether it is possible for one individual to act logically if he or she exists alone in the world (Code 268). However, Code does not ask whether women are different but the logical prospect of them to understand what men understand. Code’s purpose is based on the biological nature of women to ask whether it is reasonable for women to have particular kinds of knowledge designated stringently for a male.

Works Cited
Code, Lorraine. “Is The Sex Of The Knower Epistemologically Significant?”. Metaphilosophy, vol 12, no. 4, 1981, pp. 267-276., Accessed 23 Feb 2018.
Moore, G. Proof of an External World. Collier Books, 1962, pp. 290-292.
Russell, Bertrand. Our Knowledge of the External World-Appearance and Reality and the Existence of Matter. 16th ed., Cengage Learning, 2016, pp. 157-164.