Mumbai Attacks 26/11

Crisis Management- Mumbai Attacks 26/11
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Crisis Management- Mumbai Attacks 26/11
Introduction
Whenever a crisis occurs, the management strategies adopted play a vital role in determining the efficiency of various agents to return events to normalcy. Having a reliable communication network with clear feedback capacities enables managers to come up with an ideal plan to avert the crisis and hence save the situation (Perry, 2003; p. 153). The effects of crises may be worse if the event is a terror attack. Taneja, Pryor, MG, Sewell & Recuero describe that terror attacks are on-off events with peculiar characteristics (2014; p. 75). The events that happen are sudden and cannot be easily predicted. Additionally, terror events tend to pose high potential losses and threats to survival yet the time available to make decisions is quite short (Taylor, 2006; p. 172). In effect, such events have a ripple effect on a community and even the country concerned because of its inability to avert such crises. One of such crises is the Mumbai Attacks that took place on 26/11/2008. Mumbai is an island found close to the main Indian mainland. The city thrives on a variety of industries majorly including fisheries and tourism. On the said date, ten tourists boarded a boat from Karachi in Pakistan and after that shifted to another vessel after 40 minutes of travel. When they reached Mumbai, the terrorists killed the captain of the larger vessel, and then divided themselves into two teams each of five.

The major aim was to visit highly populated areas in a bid to ensure that they had as many casualty targets as possible.
The first stop of one of the groups was the CT station, whereby it is believed that more than 3.5 million passengers pass on a daily basis (Ramesh, 2014; p. 168). The terrorists entered and started firing indiscriminately at the people. They even lobbed a grenade at the people thereby leading to the death of 58 persons and injured more than 100 persons (Ramesh, 2014; p. 168). The attacks went on even on the roads as the terrorists targeted all people and the police. They later went to Hotel Taj, whereby they killed 32 people and injured security who came by their way in a bid to save the hostages (Ramesh, 2014; p. 169). The terrorists created a hostage situation by ensuring that the guests who locked themselves in the rooms had no avenues of escape. The attackers were consistently in touch with their operators who were seemingly aware of the events transpiring in the region through the media. How India’s government responded to the crisis had an impact on its ability to end the siege and thus, the loss of more lives during the attack.
The use of the diffusion of innovations theory and structural functions systems theories help in explaining how managers should efficiently manage crises to avert further harm. For instance, the structural functions system theory highlights that communication is critical in crisis management (Tamuz, 1991; p. 502). Thus, ensuring that the communication flow across all hierarchies is un-interfered with help in guaranteeing transparency and better assessments of the situation during the time of crisis. Similarly, the diffusion of innovation theory emphasizes on the essence information sharing in times of crises (Crelinsten, 1994; p. 61). The theory demands that all stakeholders within a system come up with a reliable method to avert the adverse effects of the crisis. Also, understanding how the incubation and critical periods may affect the outcomes of a crisis play key roles in enabling managers to respond effectively to crises thus saving more lives when confronted by similar situations such as the Mumbai attacks. Similarly, the human error theoretical construct may also facilitate better understanding as to why authorities in India are to blame for the loss of lives encountered in the attacks.
Life Cycle of a Crisis
It is believed that crises do not just occur “out of the blues.” Before the emergence of a crisis, organizations and communities experience distinguished levels of warning signs, which when addressed in time may play vital roles in enabling authorities to avert the crime (Eder & Alvintzi, 2010; p. 13). When an institution, government or community foresees a crisis, it is imperative that it puts relevant structures to ensure that if it occurs it can be efficiently managed. Alternatively, it should ensure that the crisis does not occur. A precise description of every stage of the crisis helps managers identify the ideal solutions or planning of various actions that are considered essential for recovering from a crisis (Santana, Hall, Timothy & Duval, 2003; p.310). Thus, having more information regarding the management of the crisis would be instrumental in enabling managers respond efficiently to a situation. If the authorities were aware of an impending terror attack, it is likely that they would have put in place relevant structures to ensure that the crisis does not occur. Alternatively, it would have given law enforcers adequate time to respond without necessarily leading to the high number of lives lost in the process. Poor management of any stage of the crisis model compromises the capacities of the team to avert the crisis (Burba, 2016; p. 50). Arguably, the Mumbai terror attacks required fast responses from the respective managers at all stages if the loss of lives in the event was to be averted. The following model: Pre-conditions, Trigger, Crisis and Post-Crisis phases all help in the understanding of the way in which Indian authorities dealt with the crisis to its end.
Pre-condition
There is always intelligence information related to relevant operatives before the occurrence of any terror attack. Reliable evidence indicates that India must have received information from the U.S regarding an impending terror attack (Ramesh, 2014; p. 170). While there was no specific information regarding its occurrence, it was expected that the country would prepare its law enforcers in dealing with such attacks. Relevant evidence indicates that there were interceptions of intelligent information from Mumbai Fishermen Association and Research and Analysis Wings (John stone, 2016; p. 30). The two groups had reported seeing trawlers carrying unusual cargo. The nature of Mumbai’s water transport was that there was little control of the activities taking place at the shores. As a result, it was easy for the terrorists to enter the mainland without detection. Moreover, there had been previous arrests of a terrorist found in possession of several drawings of the sites in Mumbai. It was presumed that the drawings were probably of those building being targeted for the attacks. Sadly, the reconnaissance for the attacks had taken place from 2007. However, operatives were reluctant to act.
Another challenge is that India is known to have multiple Intelligence Agencies. The agencies are expected to work together in a bid to guarantee the protection of the country from similar attacks such as the one that occurred in Mumbai in 2008 (Ramesh, 2014; p. 168). However, reliable evidence indicates that there was a muddle created between the respective agencies and thus led to a lack of coordination and efficient communication to manage the event before it occurred (Monica & Raluca, 2008; p. 260). Moreover, lack of cooperation amongst the several agencies implied that their responses to the event were fragmented. The theory of structural systems emphasizes that all the members of an organization must take responsibility in crisis management by ensuring that they make the communication lines open (Wimelius & Engberg, 2015; p. 50; Hagen, Statler & Penuel, 2013; 21). The events that transpired in Mumbai are evidence of a closed communication network that does not work as a team for the attainment of its objectives. Using the Human error theoretical construct, it would be ideal to conclude that there were latent errors in the scope of decision-making agencies amongst the intelligence networks (Helsloot, Jacobs & Boin 2012; p. 27). Had the managers and intelligence responded to the warnings presented to them in time, it is likely that they would have averted the effects of the attack.
Moreover, even the authorities agree that there was a lack of coordination amongst the agents concerned to put in place relevant measures to arrest the terrorists before the occurrence of the crisis. The wall of separation maintained by New Delhi’s government makes it impossible for the various operatives in the security forces to share information horizontally at a recommended time (Heilbrun, Wolbransky, Shah & Kelly,2010; p. 719). Falkheimer laments that the effects of having such a fragmented intelligence and security system are that no one becomes responsible for the failed responsibility of responding to the details shared by various networks that would have been influential in averting the loss of lives experienced at the time (2014; P. 55).
Trigger
India-Pakistan relationship is also said to have significantly had an impact on the choice of the region to attack. The Kargil war sparked negative relationships between India and Pakistan. Similarly, Kashmir is also believed to have been a major source of the challenge in the relation between Pakistan and Mumbai. Terror groups would use the two reasons to form the basis of their attacks. In fact, the attacks came at a time when the two countries were taking part in peace talks in a bid to resolve the dispute over Kashmir. India had previously accused Pakistan of encouraging terrorist related attacks because of the disputed border. There was a direct connection that the injustices perpetrated against that Pakistani’s because of the Kashmir border may have played key roles in triggering the attack.
A successful entry to the island on the day of the attack implied that the terrorists were likely to emerge successful in their mission. Furthermore, the terrorists were in a team of 10 individuals. The team had already put in place relevant plans on how they were going to cause havoc in the region. Mumbai was strategically located for the terrorists from Pakistan. They were able to create a disconnected communication in the mainland after they killed the captain of the vessel they used to enter Mumbai. Moreover, it is evident that the terrorists had a reliable connection with local terror networks in Mumbai who stored the ammunition that had previously been transported to the region using the trawlers. Thus, the terrorists were only looking for an ideal time when the law enforcers were unaware of the events taking place to strike. The critical period and incubation period theoretical constructs may be used to explain why law enforcers were unprepared to handle the crisis even at the time of trigger. The theoretical construct of the critical period emphasizes the need for fast responses once the disaster-triggering event sets in. The incubation period took place during the pre-condition stage when it was presumed that the security operatives would respond to the intelligence reports given. However, their lack of response made it impossible to act in time to ensure that lives were saved during the crisis. In fact, it was only until 27th November at 08.50 hours that the government special NSG forces reached Mumbai to conduct search and rescue operations. The time lapse since the terror attack started on the 26th at 21.20 hours was already too much (Ruggiero & Vos, 2013; p. 157). Probably, if there was another central location whereby the Special Forces could have responded in time implies that more lives would have been saved. The slow pace of response to the attack was arguably a major setback to the operations taking place. Bundy and Pfarrer lament that time wastage during rescue operations inhibits relevant operatives from saving more lives (2015; p. 346). In fact, Ruhl emphasizes that any rapid reaction force ought to reach at the scene of a terror incident at 30-60 minutes after a terror attack commenced (2016; p. 1; Henderson, 2008; p. 127). Thus, the rescue team also failed in terms of response time. Based on the critical time theoretical time constructs, addressing a crisis within the shortest time is instrumental in ensuring that its effects are manageable. However, poor time responses jeopardize the capacities to respond in time as is recommended (Lauras, Truptil & Bénaben, 2015; p. 690). The effects are that hostage situations occurred while it also became difficult to contain the anxiety of friends and relatives whose lives were affected by the attack.
Crisis
The crisis of the attack escalated when the terror team scattered and went ahead to attack the CST stations and the Taj Mahal Hotel. When they gained entry into the island, it was evident that the terrorists targeted areas that they were guaranteed of the highest number of casualties. The invasion into the Taj Mahal and Trident-Oberoi hotels represented the peak of the events. The terrorists entered the hotels and immediately opened fire at the people they met in the lobby of the hotel. The terrorists went ahead to hurl a grenade and moved to the sixth floor of the building, whereby they later started a fire. The action of the terrorists led to a terror situation because a majority of the hotel residents opted to lock themselves in their rooms. The terrorists would indiscriminately fire at anyone that attempted to open their doors or find rescue. It was imperative that the rescue team identify ideal ways to avert the crisis. Unfortunately, the communication channels in use for the rescue strategy were also at fault. Christensen, Lægreid, and Rykkja emphasize that security operatives should not leak vital information to the public when conducting rescue efforts (2013; p. 171). Apparently, the terrorists always rely on their networks outside to identify how they should re-strategize themselves to evade arrests as well as cause more life losses. Argenti is of the opinion that a raid exercise should immediately be conducted with an evacuation process thereby limiting the terrorists from further taking counter actions (2002; p. 107). Nonetheless, lack of a central control and a reliable communication network to direct operations made it impossible to conduct such successful initiatives to facilitate the evacuation of guests at the hotel.
Another major challenge in the attack is that the police had inaccurate details about the identity of the attackers. It was difficult to isolate and neutralize the attackers because they also aimed at ensuring that more people were saved from the fiasco. Lack of small unit tactics may have arguably led to the poor performances of the police and hence the outcomes of their rescue initiatives. The theory of diffusion of innovation demands that managers come up with reliable ways of averting a crisis (Evans & Elphick, 2005; p. 140; Fronz, 2012; 37). To this effect, it would have been ideal to put in place the special security forces with advanced training to ensure that the crisis ended as soon as possible. Lack of training and equipment for the police is also known to have escalated the number of casualties in the crisis. The bulletproof vests in use could not withstand the AK-56 and AK-47 rounds. The plastic protectors issued to the officers were only efficient for riot management and complicated tasks such as engaging terrorists. The attackers were evidently more furnished with weapons as well as the recommended skills to avert the loss of lives that was taking place at the time.
Post-Crisis
The operation of the rescue efforts took place until 29 November. Thirty-two people died in the hotel, and up to 450 guests were rescued. In total, the attack claimed the lives of more than 173 people and 308 people were wounded. Vital lessons were learnt from the attack. From the precondition stages to the crisis stages, it was evident that the security operatives in India lacked the relevant skills and capacities to respond to the attack. The development of an interception intelligence network and ensuring responsibility for the flow of command in operation was critical (Vanvactor, 2015; p. 27). Moreover, efficient management of the rescue teams and the provision of relevant training skills was considered critical for the security personnel (Liou & Lin, 2008; p. 63). Most importantly, India was advised to come up with a comprehensive coastal command that would ensure adequate monitoring of events takes place (Ruggiero & Vos, 2015; p. 142). The terrorists were able to gain access to the island because there were loopholes in the security at the coastline. The creation of an elaborate emergency crisis management system is also inevitable. It is believed that if the government had a laid out framework to handle the crisis, it is likely that the loss of many lives would have been reduced. Finally, creating a central command and control was perceived to be the greatest lesson learnt out of the incident (Mizobata, Kuboniwa & Rosefielde, 2013; p. 41). Experts emphasize that crisis situations should not be loopholes for ambiguity and demonstrating superiority (Donis, Raone, Schiffino & Taskin, 2015; p. 13). Rather, the command of control ought to demonstrate responsibility for all actions undertaken in a bid to save lives.
Recommendations
The analysis has indicated that terrorist attacks are unpredictable. However, a variety of issues can be implemented to enable authorities to avert future incidences such as the one that occurred in Mumbai. Some of the issues that should be considered with immediate effect include:
The need to pay attention to intelligence warnings- Irrespective of how scanty information is, it is imperative that proper analyses be conducted to ensure that terror groups d not find loopholes in the security network that they can exploit
Safeguard the coastal line at Mumbai- as of the tie of the attacks; the coastal area was a free movement zone. Thu, the entry, and exit of contraband materials remained unmonitored
Enhance response time-Poor responses by the military and law enforcers is known to have contributed to the loss of lives. Law enforcers responded almost 12 hours after the attack
Training of the force- Enforcers were poorly trained to handle incidences such as the one that occurred in the Mumbai attacks thus leading to many casualties
Create an official center of control, coordination, and communication- Poor communication and coordination of the forces thwarted the efforts of the officers in the rescue mission. Thus, irrespective of the different outfits of law enforcers, it would be ideal to ensure that there is a special team with a central point of control working to ensure that the rescue efforts are successful.
Summary
The pre-condition, trigger, crises and post-crises phases form a critical part of the analysis of the Mumbai 26/11 attacks. The use of relevant theories and theoretical constructs of human error and critical periods formed a vital part of the analysis. It is evident that the loss of lives in Mumbai attacks would have been reduced if there were systems to ensure better relaying of intelligence information takes place. Thus, India is encouraged to ensure that it invests in relevant counter-terrorism efforts to eliminate the chances of such events taking place in the future. Most importantly, other nations should learn from the experiences gained by India to enhance their responses to terror attacks.

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